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and the Regulative Ideal of Emergency 
Jared Schott* 
I. RE-CONCEPTUALIZING SECURITY COUNCIL POWERS 
¶1 In April 2007, the Security Council met to discuss the security implications of global 
climate change.  Framed by a British appeal for consideration of the item, deliberations focused 
on the “threat” to international peace and security posed by the cumulative (and widely 
publicized) effects of global warming.1  In so doing, the Council treaded perilously close to the 
legally operative language of Article 39 of the Charter, despite the fact that the meeting was a 
largely political showing intended to raise the profile of climate change on the international 
agenda.2  That such “ecological” matters might constitute a threat to peace and security had been 
asserted by the Council over a decade prior.3  Nevertheless, the discretionary absorption of an 
environmental item into the Council’s security domain provoked much consternation amongst 
the “downtrodden underclass” of the U.N.—those Member States not privileged to sit on the 
Council—who forcefully argued that the Council was not competent to consider such items and 
was concomitantly encroaching upon the province of the U.N.’s other organs.4  The discussion 
highlighted growing unease with the U.N.’s ability to limit a Security Council increasingly wont 
to exercise its impressive discretion by reference to security concerns, and its myriad powers 
through the invocation of Chapter VII. 
¶2 Chapter VII confers upon the Security Council the “primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.”5  To this end, the Council may employ “such 
action…as may be necessary to maintain or restore” it.6  Such constitutional carte blanche, as 
                                                 
* Institute for International Law and Justice Scholar, New York University School of Law; Legal Advisor for the 
Permanent Mission of Palau to the United Nations; LL.M., 2007, New York University School of Law; J.D., 2006, 
New York University School of Law, BA, 1999, Stanford University.  An incredible debt of gratitude is owed to 
Simon Chesterman, whose inspiration, wise counsel and good offices over the years have made my work possible.  
Thanks also to Benedict Kingsbury, Philip Alston, Thomas Franck and the entire IILJ community—particularly Liz 
Sepper and Emily Berman—for their insights and input. 
1 The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Letter dated 5 April 
2007 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the 
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council , U.N. Doc. S/2007/186 (Apr. 5, 2007). 
2 The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Annex to the letter 
dated 5 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council , ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/2007/186  (Apr. 
5, 2007). 
3 See President of the Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council, at 3, delivered to the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/23500 (Jan. 31, 1992) ( “[t]he absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in 
itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, 
humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security”). 
4 First Climate Debate Divides UN, BBC News, Apr. 18, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6562251.stm. 
5 U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1 (allocating authority “in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United 
Nations.”). 
6 U.N. Charter art. 42. 
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well as the Council’s increasing invocation of Chapter VII to justify quasi- legislative and quasi-
judicial actions, gives cause for concern to detractors wary of an unrepresentative Council whose 
powers continue to broaden in scope faster than do corresponding guarantors of accountability 
and legitimacy.  South Africa has noted that, “[o]ften, the Council has resorted to Chapter VII of 
the Charter as an umbrella for addressing issues that may not necessarily pose a threat to 
international peace and security, when it could have opted for alternative provisions of the 
Charter to respond more appropriately, utilizing other provisions of the same Charter.”7   
¶3 This encroachment has concerned diplomats and academics alike.  The academic literature 
examining this phenomenon reveals a struggle to adequately grasp the limits of Security Council 
authority, alternating uncomfortably between Council-as-political-body, Council-as-juridical-
body and Council-as-anachronism.  As Judge Shahabuddeen has inquired (and perhaps implicitly 
lamented), “Are there any limits to the Council’s power of appreciation . . . . If there are any 
limits, what are those limits and what body, if other than the Security Council, is competent to 
say what those limits are?”8 
¶4 “If angels were to govern men,”9 such inquiry would simply be academic exercise. 
However, the Council’s generous interpretation of its powers has created a schism within the 
U.N. that has hindered the organization’s effectiveness.  What is more, the Council has 
conspicuously justified practices violative of fundamental precepts of human rights law by 
reference to the exceptional nature of its Chapter VII authority.  At the same time, the Council’s 
inconsistent and ad hoc use of its vast discretionary powers has frustrated the development of a 
robust framework–be it legal, institutional or normative–to contain such powers.10  With this in 
mind, this article aims to better define the Security Council’s powers under Chapter VII, as well 
any constraints thereon, from both a positive and normative perspective.  It contends that there is 
indeed a juridical framework which holds the promise of limits and coherence for Council 
Chapter VII action.  In brief, it conceptualizes the nature of and constraints on Security Council 
power through the instructive application of emergency doctrine to Chapter VII action.   
¶5 In order to scrutinize the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers through the lens of 
emergency, this article conceives of emergency doctrine as a regulative ideal for the Council’s 
invocation of Chapter VII.  The term, a Kantian device,11 is used to link Chapter VII practice and 
emergency powers both descriptively and normatively. 12  It concedes that the perfect 
superimposition of the doctrine of legitimate emergency onto Council practice is “essentially 
unrealizable,” but nevertheless holds that such counterfactual criteria can and should guide our 
practice.13  Conceptualizing emergency powers as a regulative ideal facilitates exploring the 
paradigm of domestic emergency in order to explain the concept of Council power, and to use 
the ideal of emergency as a criterion by which we can assess, criticize and ultimately structure 
                                                 
7 U.N. SCOR, 62d Sess., 5615th mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5615 (Jan. 8, 2007). 
8 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. US), 1992 I.C.J. 114, 142 (Apr. 14) (separate opinion of Judge 
Shahabuddeen) [hereinafter Lockerbie]. 
9 THE FEDERALIST  NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
10 At the very least, the emergence of authoritative interpretations and customary law by means of subsequent 
practice is made exceedingly difficult, and norm creation is compromised.  See MARGARET KARNS & KAREN 
MINGST , INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE POLITICS AND PROCESSES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 51 (2004). 
11 See IMMANUEL KANT , THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Paul Guyer & Allen Wood trans., 1999). 
12 See, e.g., DOROTHY EMMET , THE ROLE OF THE UNREALISABLE: A STUDY IN REGULATIVE IDEALS (1994); see also 
Kenneth Abraham, The Expectations Principle as a Regulative Ideal  5 CONN. INS. L.J. 59 (1998). 
13 See, e.g., Pablo de Greiff, Deliberative Democracy and Punishment, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 373, 381-82 (2002); 
Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291, 298 (1985). 
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Chapter VII praxis.  As this article will show, the construct of a regulative ideal for Council 
action based in emergency doctrine is neither arbitrary nor fanciful.  Empirical parallels and 
congruent theoretical underpinnings suggest that the limiting principles of emergency doctrine 
should guide the invocation of and exercise of powers under Chapter VII.  
¶6 The remainder of this article is divided into four sections.  The remainder of Section I 
discusses the exceptional nature of Chapter VII and Emergency Doctrine, and explains why the 
doctrine of emergency is an appropriate prism through which to view and analyze the Security 
Council’s Chapter VII powers.  Section II analyzes the prerequisite determination of a threat to 
international peace and security under Article 39 of the Charter, applying the lexicon and 
jurisprudence of emergency declarations.  The Section considers theoretical and empirical 
limitations on domestic declarations, and analogous constraints on the Security Council’s vast 
discretion under Article 39.   
¶7 Section III argues that boundaries are more suitable—and more likely to be enforced—in 
the exercise of the actual emergency powers themselves.  Nevertheless, it notes a disturbing 
empirical trend in the exercise of Chapter VII powers, one which again mirrors a trend in 
domestic emergency regimes.  Section IV looks at the exercise of Chapter VII powers outside of 
the Security Council where the vast majority of enforcement actions occur: namely, Council-
authorized and -delegated action.  It observes a number of derogations from international law, 
rationalized solely by the exceptional need to maintain and restore international peace and 
security.  Finally, it argues that more must be done to confine Chapter VII exceptionalism and 
ensure that the powers it entrusts to other entities are not abused. 
A. The Exceptional Nature of Chapter VII and Emergency 
¶8 The doctrine of emergency is an appropriate construct by which to analyze the Security 
Council’s Chapter VII powers for many reasons.  The tension between law and security, 
exacerbated by the failure to define whether security is a primary or exclusive concern, pervades 
both the invocation and exercise of powers under Chapter VII and emergency alike.  In both 
domestic emergency and Council resort to Chapter VII, the acting authority enjoys great 
discretion in determining that a threat to security exists, and implementing those measures 
deemed necessary to restore and maintain “normalcy.”  This discretion, rooted in the need for 
flexibility and decisive action in existential matters, assumes a partly political character as it 
transcends the rigid legal rules of the “normal” system. Yet both sets of powers have proven 
themselves vulnerable to unaccountable and illegitimate practice.  Domestic emergency regimes 
tend to become normalized, as states of emergency extend beyond temporal and spatial divides 
and emergency powers become an ordinary technique of governance.  In the process, substantive 
and procedural constitutional checks are bypassed, separations of power erode, and arbitrary 
governmental action becomes the norm, bolstered by judicial deference. 
¶9 Similar phenomena are apparent in the evolution of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.  The 
Council’s inconsistent and ambiguous practice has eluded the imposition of any binding 
substantive or procedural constraints which can be gleaned from the Charter.  What is more, 
against the backdrop of inadequate judicial review, the Council has broadly construed its powers 
under Chapter VII and expanded its jurisdiction from traditional matters of security to new 
spheres previously under the purview of other organs and non-U.N. entities.  Likewise, the 
Council has over time assumed quasi- legislative and quasi- judicial functions under Chapter VII, 
straining conceptions of propriety and institutional competence.  In so doing, it puts at risk the 
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constitutionalism and republicanism ingrained in the Charter, and compromises the 
accountability and legitimacy of the Council—if not the U.N. as a whole.14 
¶10 Notwithstanding these indiscretions, neither emergency powers nor Chapter VII exist 
outside of the law.  Although they transcend the rigidity of ordinary legal rules, they remain 
subject to broader constitutional standards.  Within the domestic realm, these standards are 
actualized through the jurisprudence and doctrine of legitimate emergency; at the international 
level, the U.N. has yet to adequately effectuate the Charter’s limiting principles, though an 
adherence to legalism permeates Council practice.  With this in mind, this article argues that the 
theory and practice of emergency provide both a basis for assessing Council action, as well as 
limits by which to legitimize it.  The architecture of emergency powers offers valuable 
descriptive and normative insights into the legal space in which the Security Council operates.  
By comparing it to relevant domestic empirical and jurisprudential practice, the article suggests 
reforms and mechanisms through which Council action can be executed accountably and 
efficaciously. 
¶11 Second, the paradigm of emergency is an apt framework through which to view Chapter 
VII powers because it succeeds in capturing the complexities of the Council’s place within the 
international legal system in ways that other frameworks cannot.  Simplistically rigid legal 
approaches fail to adequately account for the Council’s role in the creation of international law, 
as well as its ability to derogate from international law when acting to uphold or restore 
international peace and security. 15  On the other hand, theories of a purely political Council fail 
to give proper weight to the distinct adherence to legalism permeating the Council’s work, as 
well as the constitutional primacy of the Charter operating on the Council through both legal and 
accountability mechanisms.  More “centrist” doctrines such as implied powers work well where 
necessity and the language of the Charter operate along the same vector16; however, where one is 
pitted against the other, as in the cases of human rights violations explored later, it presents an 
                                                 
14 The concept of accountability “implies that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to 
judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they 
determine that these responsibilities have not been met.” Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and 
Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29 (2005). Legitimacy, a similarly elastic concept, 
implicates an entity’s credibility, sometimes as a function of the “fairness” with which it acts. See  THOMAS 
FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995). It is alternatively defined by Franck as “a 
property of a rule or rulemaking institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed 
normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in 
accordance with generally accepted principles;” with respect to international organizations and their organs, 
legitimacy typically requires “some combination of conformity to shared norms and to established law.” THOMAS 
FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990). 
15 MARTEN ZWANENBURG, ACCOUNTABILITY OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 156 (2005). 
16 The rule of implied powers is perhaps best stated by the International Court of Justice in its Reparations for 
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Advisory Opinion. There, in determining that the United 
Nations had the authority to bring a claim on behalf of its employees, the Court stated that an organization such as 
the United Nations “must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are 
conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.” Reparations for 
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 182 (Apr. 11) [hereinafter 
Reparations]. See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 52 (Jun. 
21) [hereinafter Legal Consequences] (“the powers of the Council under Article 24 are not restricted to the specific 
grants of authority contained in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII… [T]he Members of the United Nations have 
conferred upon the Security Council powers commensurate with its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and 
security”). Consider also the minimalist “inherent powers” variation of the doctrine, seen in Certain Expenses of the 
United Nations (Art. 17, para . 2, of the Charter),  Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (Jul. 20) (“when the 
Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated 
purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization”). 
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under-nuanced and insufficiently robust conceptualization of the fundamentally different nature 
of Chapter VII power. 
¶12 Emergency provides a more accurate and comprehensive treatment in both its normative 
treatments and empirical realities.17  Though an “immanent tension between facticity and 
validity”18 marks the exception, emergency doctrine takes a constitutional approach where the 
primary benchmarks of legitimate emergency are not specific rules, but rather standards 
supported by secondary rules.19  This constitutionalism is no mere chimerical device; it is the 
dispositive link between the concepts of Chapter VII and emergency.  As an organ of the U.N., 
the Council derives its authority from the Charter, an international compact delegating Member 
State authority and conferring the resulting enforcement power on the Council. 20  But the Charter 
is no mere treaty; it is king among all treaties.21  It is a constitution, “reflect[ing] constitutional 
principles . . . in force long before the Charter was drafted,” and incorporating them into a new 
legal order.22  As the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has observed, this constitutionality has 
significant ramifications for the exercise of Council power: 
The Security Council is an organ of an international organization, established by a 
treaty which serves as a constitutional framework for that organization.  The 
Security Council is thus subjected to certain constitutional limitations, however 
broad its powers under the constitution may be. Those powers cannot, in any case, 
go beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of the Organization at large, not to 
mention other specific limitations or those which may derive from the internal 
division of power within the Organization.  In any case, neither the text nor the 
spirit of the Charter conceives of the Security Council as legibus solutus (unbound 
by law).23 
From its inception, then, despite the Council’s jurisdiction over security and its license to 
respond essentially “as it sees fit,” juridical bounds have always existed, as the Charter has 
                                                 
17 For fuller treatises on the theory and history of emergency doctrine, see GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE STATE OF 
EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., 2005);  CLINT ON ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP  (1948); OREN GROSS 
& FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE  19 (2006); 
DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY (2006); CARL SCHMITT, THE 
CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 26 (George Schwab trans., 1976); see also JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT  §§159-62 (1691) (on the prerogative). 
18 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS:  CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND 
DEMOCRACY  9 (William Rehg trans. 1996) [hereinafter BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS] 
19 See RICHARD POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT : THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006). 
20 DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE DELEGATION 
BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL OF ITS CHAPTER VII POWERS 26-27 (1999). 
21 Under Article 103, “[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations 
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the 
present Charter shall prevail.” U.N. Charter art. 103 (emphasis added). 
22 BARDO FASSBENDER, U.N.  SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM AND THE RIGHT OF VETO: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 99 (1998); see also id. at 27 (citing HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 124-25 
(1945)).  Beyond the “constitutional moment” of its postwar drafting and enactment, Thomas Franck distinguishes 
the Charter as a constitution along several other dimensions: its “pervasive perpetuity,” and universality; its 
indelibleness, and entrenched provisions; its primacy, as ordained by Article 103; and its institutional autochthony, 
establishing parameters but ultimately engendering a self-perpetuating entity. Thomas Franck, Is the U.N. Charter a 
Constitution?, in NEGOTIATING FOR PEACE : LIBER AMICORUM TONO EITEL 95 (Jochen Abr. Frowein et al. eds., 
2003). 
23 Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 28 (Oct. 2, 1995). 
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provided standards to ensure—as opposed to rigidly dictate—legitimate and accountable Council 
action.    In Chapter VII and elsewhere, protocols and standards exist to limit the otherwise free 
hand of the Council under Chapter VII.   
¶13 The doctrine of emergency ably effectuates the limiting “superordinate legal principles”24 
of the Charter.  It provides the contours for mechanisms of governance and exercises of power 
fundamentally congruent to those of Chapter VII.  It confines executive discretion within the 
bounds of genuine exception while protecting against arbitrary and illegitimate uses of 
emergency power.  Perhaps most importantly, it offers a valuable paradigm through which 
aspirations towards a constitutionalized international law can be reconciled with the Security 
Council’s intrinsically political nature and prodigious powers.  In the end, the propositions put 
forth by this article echo the theme of a contemporary international legal system “less coherent 
and reassuring than the old one,” “yet . . . several steps up the evolutionary ladder.”25  Such a 
tradeoff is certainly a worthwhile venture if we are to perpetuate a constitutional, albeit uneasy, 
coexistence among Chapter VII, the provisions of the Charter, and international law generally. 
II. DETERMINATION AS DECLARATION 
¶14 Article 39 is the gatekeeper of Chapter VII, the threshold at which the Council changes 
from multilateral organ into global executive sans pareil.  Under its terms,  
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. 26 
If the Security Council seeks to invoke the binding powers of Articles 41 and 42 to enforce its 
decisions, the plain language of the Charter dictates that it must make a determination of any (1) 
threat to the peace, (2) breach of the peace, or (3) act of aggression.  Only then may the Security 
Council employ a broad array of powers, including the use of force and coercive measures, 
making such determination “a caveat which bestows upon the Security Council a power of 
appreciation not easily subject to control.”27  Notably, the provisions of Article 39 itself are 
seemingly the only component of Chapter VII less given to limitation than the myriad offspring 
powers, a point evidenced by the ambiguous text of Article 39 and subsequent practice.   
¶15 Much as the Article 39 determination acts as formal requisite to the exercise of Chapter 
VII powers, so too does the declaration of emergency enable the appropriate domestic body to 
invoke hitherto proscribed authorities.  In both systems, though the acting body has often been 
complicit in the expansion of exception beyond constitutional bounds, both theory and practice 
militate against overly rigid constraints.  The remainder of this Section identifies and evaluates 
procedural and substantive restraints on domestic discretion in declaring emergency, as well as 
                                                 
24 See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE DIVIDED WEST (Ciaran Cronin ed., trans., 2006);  see also JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 
Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace: At Two Hundred Years’ Historical Remove, in THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: 
STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY 165 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo de Greiff eds., 2000). 
25 Andrea Bianchi, Ad-Hocism and the Rule of Law, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 263, 269 (2002) (citing Georges Abi Saab, 
Cours général de droit international public, 207 RdC (1987-VII), at 460). 
26 U.N. Charter art. 39. 
27 Mariano J. Aznar-Gómez, A Decade of Human Rights Protection by the U.N. Security Council: A Sketch of 
Deregulation?, 13 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 223, 234 (2002).  
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those placed upon Council discretion in the application of Article 39.  It finds that the imposition 
of robust substantive constraints has frequently failed due to the inherently political nature of the 
determination, in concert with timid judicial review.  Indeed, the architecture of domestic 
emergency systems suggests that legitimizing principles are best channeled through procedural 
limits.  Though such procedural limits can rectify the most egregious infirmities in Council 
practice, they do not negate the need for more potent constraints.  Rather, substantive limits are 
better applied to the exercise of Chapter VII (“emergency”) powers themselves. 
A. The Procedural Characteristics of Emergency Declaration 
¶16 Though unable to shape the content of the emergency state, procedural limits “beget 
legitimacy”28 by ensuring that the commencement of emergency is transparent and predictable.  
By no means is the imposition of procedural constraints uniform across domestic systems, nor 
are constraints uniformly honored where in existence.  Where honored, though, they act as 
emergency-specific secondary rules and proxy for less articulable constitutional precepts.    
¶17 Two kinds of procedural requirements generally arise within the context of emergency 
powers.  The first is an actual declaration; that is, the declarer must provide notice of the 
declaration with supporting details.  In so providing, a government makes the argument that it is 
legally justified in departing from specified legal commitments, as opposed to simply stating that 
it is derogating as a matter of fact.29   
¶18 Domestically, where the requirement exists, declarations of a state of emergency are 
typically published in the official register,30 though some countries require broadcast 
dissemination of the details.31  At the international level, major treaties require a dual-notice 
system of both domestic proclamation and international notification.  The International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) requires that states declaring an emergency, under which 
they intend to derogate from the provisions of the Covenant, commit themselves to official 
proclamation at home and immediate international notification containing “full information 
about the measures taken and a clear explanation of the reasons for them, with full 
documentation attached regarding [the country’s] law.”32  Even when treaties do not require 
domestic proclamation, courts have found that, regardless, some “formal and public act of 
derogation” is needed to avoid the sanction of nullity.33  Other treaties similarly provide for 
international reporting, with a regional split as to whether the termination of measures should be 
                                                 
28 BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 18, at 135. 
29 SUBRATA ROY CHOWDHURY, RULE OF LAW IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY: THE PARIS MINIMUM STANDARDS OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY 11 (1989). 
30 In Israel, declarations are published in the Reshumot.  See Basic Law: The Government, 2001, S.H. 158, ¶ 38(d). 




31 State of Emergency Law, supra  note 30,  at art. 3(4) (stating “[t]he reasons for the decision to declare a state of 
emergency, its duration and scope shall be broadcast on Turkish radio and television and, if the Council of Ministers 
deem it necessary, also disseminated through other media.”). 
32 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at arts. 4, 40, U.N. GAOR, 21st 
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Human Rights Committee, General 
Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4) , ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001) 
[hereinafter General Comment No. 29]. 
33See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights art. 27, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; 
JAIME ORAÁ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (1992). 
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provided for prospectively.34  In practice though, short, over-generalized and justification- lacking 
reports plague the system, 35 with inconsistent judicial rebuke for such failures.36   
¶19 The second significant procedural check on declarations of emergency relates to the 
allocation of authority between branches of government, and determines the channels through 
which states may validly make such declarations.  This allocation tends to reflect broader 
normative conceptions regarding separation of powers and legitimacy.  For instance, German law 
historically required that the head of state issue such declarations, while the “dominant principle 
in the French tradition” has been that such power resides in parliament alone.37  The Roman 
system left full discretion to the executive Consuls, although in practice the Senate proposed 
recommendations.38  Where countries assign the power of declaration to the executive, some 
form of ratification, such as ministerial counter-signatures, parliamentary authorization or simply 
parliamentary notification, is often constitutionally required.39  Other countries place declaratory 
powers primarily in the hands of the parliamentary body. 40  The existence of such provisions 
reflects both the need for legitimacy in the context of emergency declarations and the inadequacy 
of substantive checks on such a discretionary matter. 
B. The Substantive Criteria of the Emergency Declaration 
¶20 Central to any proper consideration of a declaration of emergency is whether the turmoil 
underlying the declared state qualifies as a genuine emergency.  Here, theory diverges from 
practice, and formal law is divorced from its enforceability.  This is not to say that formal 
substantive requirements for a declaration of emergency are particularly demanding; in fact, 
more often than not the majority of the exercise is left to the discretion of the declarer.   
¶21 Cognizant of the free hand given to the declaratory authority, academic approaches to 
establishing legitimizing constraints have focused on cabining discretion within finite normative 
bounds as opposed to inflexible legal rules.  Imminence is one such requirement.  The U.N.-
commissioned Questiaux report advises that a declaration of emergency is only justified by 
danger that is “extreme and imminent”; the International Law Association uses the phrase 
“actual or imminent.”41  A second criterion relates to the scope and gravity of the threat.  The 
threat must be of such a magnitude, directed at “the organized existence of the community which 
                                                 
34 See, e.g., ACHR, supra note 33, at art. 27.3 (requiring a prospective termination date); see also Richard B. Lillich, 
Queensland Guidelines for Bodies Monitoring Respect for Human Rights During States of Emergency, 85 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 716, 717 (1991) [hereinafter Queensland Guidelines]; cf. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention] (requiring 
only post hoc report on termination). 
35 ORAÁ, supra note 33, at 76-77. 
36 See Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) 72-73 (1960-61) (Report of the Commission) (holding that 
inadequate reporting could not in itself nullify Irish derogations); see also Brogan & Others v. United Kingdom, 
145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 16 (1988). 
37 AGAMBEN, supra note 17, at 12. 
38 GROSS & NÍ AOLÁIN, supra note 17, at 24. 
39 For a list of citations to such provisions, see id., at 56. 
40 See, e.g., XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 67, § 20 (1982) (P.R.C.), available at http://english.gov.cn/2005-
08/05/content_20813.htm; see also Basic Law: The Government, 2001, S.H. 158, ¶ 38(d) (delegating the power to 
determine and declare emergencies to the Knesset, as well as sole authority to ratify and renew Governmental 
declarations). 
41 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. Of Minorities, 
Study of Implications for Human Rights of Recent Developments Concerning Situations Known as States of Siege or 
Emergency, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/15 (Jul, 27, 1982) (prepared by Nicole Questiaux) [hereinafter 
Questiaux] (emphasis added); CHOWDHURY, supra note 29, at 11. 
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forms the basis of the State,”42 that a state of emergency is “indispensable to the preservation of 
the state and its constitutional order.”43 Moreover, the “whole of the population or the whole 
population of the area to which the declaration applies” must be affected.44  The threat must also 
be “temporary” in nature, with measures aimed to reinstate prior conditions as soon as possible.45   
¶22 Some of the principles promoted in these definitional criteria appear in the varying laws of 
domestic systems—at least formally.  One such constraint is the stratification of emergency.  
Under constitutional systems, the level of emergency declared determines the methods of 
declaration, the duration of the state of emergency and the subsequent scope of powers.46  In 
some cases, this simply reflects the unintended creep of emergency powers from matters of 
existential magnitude into non-security-related areas.47  However, a practice common to 
Continental Europe provides for the more robust check of subdividing their security-related 
emergency provisions based on the gravity of the situation faced.48  The plain text of the U.N. 
charter also offers a potentially comparable taxonomy that—between a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace and act of aggression—has eluded consistent practice and formal criteria. 
¶23 A second constitutional restraint involves the use of temporal and territorial limits.  Sunset 
clauses provide for the automatic termination of states of emergency without an affirmative 
renewal or extension, typically by other legislative channels.  Authorities charged with 
declaratory powers may also specify the applicability of the state of exception to the whole or 
parts of the country. 49  Such provisions allow for more narrowly tailored responses consistent 
with principles of necessity and proportionality.  They have a darker side as well, however, 
imposing separate lega l rights and duties on citizens of various regions, often according to 
ethnoreligious demography.   
¶24 The final constitutional requirement noted here is imminence.  The present French 
constitution requires that French institutions, independence or territoria l integrity must be 
“seriously and immediately threatened”50 in order for a state of emergency to be declared.  Sri 
Lanka requires that the emergency in fact exist or be at least imminent.51  Under international 
law, states of emergency must respond to an actual or imminent crisis; those “of a preventive 
nature” are unlawful.52  Such provisions, if enforced, significantly cut back on the potentially 
infinite justifications available to the declaratory power. 
                                                 
42 Questiaux, supra note 41, at ¶ 23. 
43 ROSSITER, supra note 17, at 298-99. 
44 CHOWDHURY, supra note 29, at 11. 
45 ROSSITER, supra note 19, at 300. 
46 See GROSS & NÍ AOLÁIN, supra note 17, at 41-43. 
47 For instance, Turkey differentiates between violence/public order emergencies and those relating to natural 
disasters. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY arts. 119-20 (1982) (Turk.). In Latin and South 
American countries nine different states of exception are provided for. GROSS & NÍ AOLÁIN, supra note 17, at 42. 
48 For instance, the Dutch Constitution distinguishes between a “state of siege,” “state of emergency” and “state of 
war.” GRONDWET [GW.] [Constitution] arts. 96, 103 (1815) (Neth.). Under the Portuguese Constitution, a state of 
“siege” may be declared where there exists “actual or imminent aggression by foreign forces, serious threat to or 
disturbance of the democratic constitutional order or public calamity.”  A state of “emergency,” though, is 
applicable to circumstances “less serious” than those delineated above.  CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE 
REPUBLIC art. 19 (1976) (Port.), available at http://www.parlamento.pt/ingles/cons_leg/crp_ing/index.html; see also 
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] arts. 12, 80, 87, 91, 115 (1993) (F.R.G.). 
49 See, e.g., Public Security Ordinance, Ordinance No. 25, §5 (1947) (Sri Lanka), available at 
http://www.tamilnation.org/srilankalaws/47publicsecurity.htm. 
50 LA CONST ITUTION art. 16 (1958) (Fr.), available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp. 
51 Radhika Coomaraswamy & Charmaine de los Reyes, Rule by Emergency: Sri Lanka’s Postcolonial Constitutional 
Experience, 2 INT’L J. CONST . L. 272, 275 (2004). 
52 ORAÁ, supra note 33, at 27. 
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¶25 Still, many countries impose few if any restraints on the declaration of emergency.  Sri 
Lanka’s Public Security Ordinance provides that the Governor-General may declare an 
emergency where he is “of the opinion that it is expedient to do” so, making such regulations 
appear “necessary or expedient” in the interests of public security. 53  Needless to say, such terms 
do not make for judicially enforceable standards.  Even where unchecked political discretion is 
less blatant, it is not necessarily any more circumscribed, as the use of broad and malleable 
terms—“public order,” “security,” “liberal-democratic constitution”—provides little hindrance to 
government entities seeking to justify exceptional alterations in the power structure.    
¶26 The major international human rights instruments provide a second legal check on 
declarations through built- in derogation provisions that simultaneously allow for this 
inevitability while establishing principled bounds.  It is this international system that provides the 
theoretical contours for states of emergency.  The United Kingdom, in a Commission on Human 
Rights Drafting Committee, first introduced the idea of a derogation provision, and thereby 
sparked a subsequent debate in the ICCPR drafting consultations about how broadly to construe 
the circumstances allowing for derogation.54  Countries sought to limit the elasticity of the 
“emergency” term, and debated whether an explicit list of non-derogable provisions was the 
proper solution. 55  In the end, article 4(1) of the ICCPR provides that: 
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the 
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present 
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present 
Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations 
under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of 
race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.56 
Subsequent interpretation by the Human Rights Committee further define the terms of Article 4, 
adding to the meaning of “strictly required” by noting that “the restoration of a state of 
normalcy…must be the predominant objective,” and the emergency must be limited by 
“duration, geographical coverage and material scope.”57  The derogation provisions of the other 
major instruments are consonant with Article 4 of the ICCPR, differing primarily in terminology 
and the inclusion of an explicit nondiscrimination provision. 58  On the whole, these provisions 
provide firm and unambiguous limits on emergency powers, as well as seemingly justiciable 
procedural requirements and normative declaratory requirements.  The force of these principled 
checks, however, has been blunted by inconsistent judicial review at the domestic and 
international levels.   
                                                 
53 Public Security Ordinance, supra  note 49, at § 5. 
54 See OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: 
A MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR JUDGES, PROSECUTORS AND LAWYERS 816-17, U.N. Doc. HR/P/PT/9, U.N. 
Sales No. E.02.XIV.3 (2003), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/CHAPTER_16.pdf. 
55 Id. at 818 (citing U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.195 ¶ 69). 
56 ICCPR, supra note 32, at art. 4(1). 
57 General Comment No. 29, supra  note 32, at ¶¶2 , 4; see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm.  
on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. Of Minorities, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation 
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/4 (1984), 
available at http://hei.unige.ch/~clapham/hrdoc/docs/siracusa.html. 
58 ACHR, supra note 33, at art. 27; European Convention, supra note 34, at art. 15. 
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C. Judicial Review of Declarations: An Unruly Margin of Appreciation? 
¶27 Within the domestic context, judicial review is particularly troublesome.  Even where a 
strong and independent judiciary exists, the declaration of emergency is typically a decision 
made at the discretion of the executive or parliament.  Typically, great deference is shown to the 
decisions of those bodies charged with jurisdiction over national security, and judges are hesitant 
to invalidate measures when doing so might put national security at risk.59  Further, questions of 
justiciability emerge as judges struggle to locate “judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards”60 in policy areas in which they have little expertise.  A final infirmity of domestic 
judicial review lies in its enforceability.  Even where judicial review does invalidate 
governmental action, the other branches of government typically respond quickly to change the 
laws so as to allow for actions they have hitherto deemed necessary for public security. 61   
¶28 Such judicial give-and-take is not a phenomenon unique to countries with traditionally 
underdeveloped judicial systems, nor those with commanding executive branches.62  It has often 
been up to supranational judicial systems to effectuate bona fide review, with inconsistent 
results.63  The work of treaty bodies and international courts of review has not met the lofty 
Queensland aspirations, suggesting that the principles of legitimate emergency are less binding 
than ideal.64  Lacking truly effective fact- finding mechanisms, international courts have been 
reluctant to question the discretion of national governments in determining that a state of 
emergency is justified.65  For this reason and others, international courts have accorded a “wide 
margin of appreciation” to States party to international instruments in their declarations of 
emergency.  Earlier European Court of Human Rights cases adhered to this “margin of 
appreciation” and deferred to government determinations despite serious questions about the 
existence of a public emergency. 66   
¶29 Where courts have intervened, it is often due to politics.  The European Commission was 
widely seen to be censuring Greece’s military government in finding that no emergency existed 
to justify repressive measures undertaken in the wake of the “National Revolution” in 1967.67  In 
many ways, the case is a microcosm of European regional emergency jurisprudence, the 
                                                 
59 See, e.g., Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.) (holding that the validity of 
the Communist Party Dissolution Act does not depend upon proof of the facts recited in the preamble as justification 
for the Act.). 
60 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
61 Following a Sri Lankan Supreme Court decision asserting powers of review over emergency declarations and 
measures, the government responded with a constitutional amendment prohibiting judicial review of emergency 
proclamations.  See, e.g., Joseph Perera v. Attorney General [1992] 1 S.L.R. 199 (Sri Lanka ); THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA art. 154(J)(2) (1978), available at 
http://www.priu.gov.lk/Cons/1978Constitution/1978ConstitutionWithoutAmendments.pdf; see also Coomaraswamy 
& de los Reyes, supra note 51, at 287-88. 
62 See, e.g., A. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 87 (appeal taken 
from Eng.) (U.K.) (calling for deference to determinations of emergency, even where government has conceded no 
attack is imminent). 
63 See GROSS & NÍ AOLÁIN, supra note 17, at 8-13. 
64 Queensland Guidelines, supra note 34, at 718 (arguing for an objective determination of whether a public 
emergency actually existed and whether proper procedures were followed). 
65 GROSS & NÍ AOLÁIN, supra note 17, at 267. 
66 See, e.g., Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 56, 84 (1960-61) (Court decision); see also Brannigan & 
McBride v. United Kingdom, 258-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 34 (1993). 
67 Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 12, 186 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.);  see James Becket, The Greek Case 
before the European Human Rights Commission, 1 HUM. RTS. 91, 113 (1970); see also  GROSS & NÍ AOLÁIN, supra 
note 17, at 275. 
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somewhat hollow assertion of judicial authority enervated by the supremacy of political 
considerations.  The European experience speaks to the impressive discretion of the “declarer” 
and the ultimately political nature of the exercise.  Though courts may rule on procedural matters 
and require some evidence supporting the validity of a determination, they have proven 
unwilling, if not unable, to hold governmental authorities to substantive requirements mandated 
by treaty and theory.   
¶30 By contrast, the now-obsolete United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC) undertook 
a more substantive approach to review, but was hampered by its advisory nature.68  This “soft” 
global review, while nonbinding, evidenced a universal awareness of the abuse of emergency 
regimes, as well as a normative sentiment supporting accountability and transparency in 
invoking emergency.  Nevertheless, deep and searching review of Member State reports by and 
large eluded the HRC, which frequently had to stop at procedural review focusing on insufficient 
evidence in the face of egregiously inadequate Member State reports. 69   
¶31 The legal, political and practical challenges of using judicial review to counteract improper 
declarations of emergency, as well as the possible impropriety of doing so, suggest that 
substantive and legal constraints may more ably and effectively guide the exercise of emergency 
powers themselves, as opposed to the preceding declaration.  Still, objective criteria and 
corresponding restraints have appeared at times within the system, and may well prove more 
applicable in the context of Article 39.   
D. The Carte Blanche Determination of a Threat to the Peace… 
¶32 It is only once an Article 39 determination is made that the Security Council can move 
beyond its “regular” fact-finding and recommendatory powers to the “exceptional” powers of 
Chapter VII. 70  Like a declaration of emergency, Article 39 acts as not simply precursor to, but 
also justification for, the exercise of such powers.   
1. The Charter and the Council’s Lone Discretion… 
¶33 Much as emergency declarations can be a primarily political act of discretion, the Article 
39 determination is regarded as the central repository of Council discretion within the Charter.  
As initially presented at Dumbarton Oaks, Article 39 (at the time, Section VIII-B) consisted of a 
transition to enforcement measures in two paragraphs.71  The first, rejected as unnecessary, dealt 
with the specific instance of a failed dispute settlement as constituting a threat to international 
peace and security.  The second contained the provisions that now constitute Article 39, 
                                                 
68 Many States disregarded Committee requests and findings. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Report of the 
Human Rights Committee, ¶ 108, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/34/40 (Sept. 27, 1979); U.N. 
Human Rights Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
A/39/40 (Sept. 20, 1984). 
69 See ORAÁ, supra  note 33, at 21 (citing U.N. Human Rights Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, 
Communication No. R. 2/11, Adoption of Views, ¶¶ 14-16, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/35/40 
(Jul. 29, 1980); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, Communication No. R. 8/34, 
Adoption of Views, ¶¶ 8-9, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (Apr. 8, 1981)). 
70 See U.N. Charter art. 39 (citing that “[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence”); see SIMON 
CHEST ERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE?: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 124-25 
(2001); see also THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 726 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2002). 
71 RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 1940-1945 
669 (1958). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [ 2 0 0 7  
 
 36 
authorizing a more general determination of the existence of any threat. Dumbarton was 
followed by six and a half weeks of intense diplomatic exchanges culminating in the February 
1945 conference at Yalta, and two months later the San Francisco Founding Conference (April 
25, 1945 – June 26, 1945).  At San Francisco, the “over-nice distinctions,” which more clearly 
defined the different phases of a dispute and the particular measures which might apply, were 
done away with so that the “provision should be left as broad and flexible as possible.”72  The 
“evaluation of circumstances” was to be left entirely to the Council, imparting “wide latitude” of 
discretion to the Security Council in determining the existence of a threat to the peace.73  This 
Council volition prompted the United States delegate to remark, “[I]f any single provision of the 
Charter has more substance than the others, it is surely this one sentence, in which are 
concentrated the most important powers of the Security Council.”74 
¶34 Other countries were less comfortable with such Council prerogative, and attempted to 
provide a counterbalance by explicitly defining the three states of exception contained in Article 
39.  Though it was accepted that Chapter VII required a situation of greater gravity than one 
“endangering the maintenance of international peace,”75 no further criteria defining and 
distinguishing the three Article 39 states of exception were initially put in place.  The term 
“threat to the peace” has subsequently eluded categorization, while a “breach of the peace” has 
come to mean hostilities between armed units.76  Only an “act of aggression” has been even 
partially defined.77   
¶35 From the beginning, the use of the term “aggression” was a point of debate.78  During the 
drafting process, various amendments seeking to make automatic the finding of an act of 
aggression, and require subsequent pre-defined responses, were rejected.79  The Permanent 
Members of the Council resisted, arguing that anything constituting an act of aggression could 
legitimately be an act of self-defense under Article 51 depending on the circumstances.80  
Therefore, a flexible response was in order.   
¶36 The issue was raised again in later sessions of the General Assembly, which—after much 
debate and several resolutions postponing a final decision—adopted a definition in 1974.81  Still, 
the years of General Assembly deliberation were in the end ineffectual, as the General Assembly 
definition is “neither intended nor able to limit the jurisdiction of the Security Council under 
Article 39.”82  While aggression is defined as “the use of armed force by a State against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other 
                                                 
72 Secretary of State, Charter of the United Nations: Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco 
Conference by the Chairman of the United States Delegation, The Secretary of State, 90-91 (Jun. 26, 1945) (Dep’t. 
of State Publ. 2349) [hereinafter Report to the President]. 
73 Id.; RUSSELL, supra note 71, at 670. 
74  Report to the President, supra  note 72, at 90-91. 
75 U.N. Charter arts. 34, 37. 
76 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 70, at 721.  In the first 44 years of the UN, 
the Council made only three determinations of a “breach of the peace,” in Korea (1950), the Falkland Islands (1982), 
and Iran-Iraq (1987).  CHESTERMAN (2001), supra note 70, at 114. 
77 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXII), Annex arts. 1-4, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
78 The United States argued that it should be subsumed within the “breach of peace” language, while the USSR 
countered that it merited distinct mention. RUSSELL, supra note 71, at 464-65. 
79 For examp le, Colombia sought to put text in the Charter preamble stating that any “attempt on territorial integrity, 
sovereignty, or independence of any state would constitute an act of aggression,” and a Bolivian amendment sought 
to require the automatic application of sanctions in response. Id. at 670-73. 
80 Id. 
81 See G.A. Res. 599 (VI) (Jan. 31, 1952); G.A. Res. 688 (VII) (Dec. 20, 1952); G.A. Res. 3314, supra  note 77. 
82 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 70, at 722. 
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manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations,” the resolution offers only a partial 
list of exemplary situations, and explicitly holds that the Council may consider “other relevant 
circumstances” in disregarding the resolution’s articles.83  Even if this definition were strictly 
applied to Article 39, it would not affect those most momentous Council determinations 
occurring at the proverbial margins, where precedent ebbs and political discretion flows. 
¶37 The Council has fiercely guarded—with great success—its birthright of sole and plenary 
discretion in such matters.  Its permanent members have stood firm against more legalist 
conceptions of Article 39, and maintained their province relatively free of encroachment.  Where 
the primacy of the Council in the maintenance of international peace and security is called into 
question, it is most often done so in response to Council inaction, in order to fill a perceived 
vacuum where the Council has expressed reticence in the invocation of its Chapter VII powers.  
In this respect, the parliamentary check posed by General Assembly action under the Uniting for 
Peace resolution, or the organizational substitute offered by regional peace operations, differ 
from their domestic analogues. 
¶38 On multiple occasions, due to the Cold War paralysis of the Security Council, the General 
Assembly explicitly referenced Article 39 or utilized language in resolutions pertaining to 
specific situations that called for the imposition or strengthening of Chapter VII sanctions.84  
Wary of the possible intrusion into matters reserved specifically for the Council, several 
delegations made note that the division of competence between the two organs should be 
respected, and that the General Assembly should avoid making any “purported determinations” 
of the existence of a threat to peace and security.  In discussions over the Question of Palestine, 
the Canadian delegation repeatedly stated that the Council “alone” had the mandate—in fact, the 
“prerogative”—to determine what constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and 
that the Assembly was not the appropriate body for such a discussion. 85   
¶39 Following the end of the Cold War, the use of Article 39 lexicon in General Assembly 
resolutions has been disfavored, and General Assembly resolutions pertaining to matters 
exclusively within Council jurisdiction have heeded the earlier-voiced objections and 
subsequently refrained from using such terminology. 86  Though the Assembly has been willing to 
offer its perspective to rectify the failings of Council inaction, its awareness of exclusive Council 
domain over determinations regarding threats to the peace, in addition to the waning and 
arguably discredited use of Article 39 determination in Assembly resolutions, further suggest 
that the Council possesses a near-sovereign authority to determine international exceptions. 
¶40 The Secretary-General represents a second influence, if not a “check,” on this authority. 
Under the Charter, the Secretary-General is to act as the “chief administrative officer” of the 
U.N., and is charged to perform functions entrusted to him by, amongst other organs, the 
                                                 
83 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 77, Annex arts. 1-4. 
84 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 37/123, ¶¶ 2, 7-8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/123 (Dec. 20, 1982); G.A. Res. 36/226, preamble, ¶ 6, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/226 (Dec. 17, 1981); G.A. Res. 39/146, ¶¶ 2, 7-8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ 39/146 (Dec. 14, 1984).  
For a more complete list, see Repertory of Practice of the United Nations Organs: Extracts Relating to Article 39 of 
the Charter of the United States, Supplement 6 (1979-1984) , volume 3, at 17, available at 
http://www.untreaty.un.org/cod/ repertory/art39/English/rep_supp6_vol3_art39_e.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2007). 
85 Id. at ¶ 26 (citing U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., 93d plen. mtg. ¶ 130 (Canada); U.N. GAOR, ES -7, 30th mtg. at 54-55 
(Canada)). 
86 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/40, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/40 (Dec. 1, 2005); G.A. Res 60/41, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/41 
(Dec. 1, 2005). 
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Security Council.87  In this capacity, the Secretary-General has occasionally played a significant 
role in influencing Council Article 39 determinations.88 
¶41 The Secretary-General has also acted in matters of international peace and security without 
the invitation of the Security Council.  Under Article 99, the Secretary-General may “bring to the 
attention” of the Council “any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of 
international peace and security.”89  Under the stewardship of Trygve Lie, the Secretary-General 
established its right to offer unsolicited opinions to the Council, and engage in fact- finding under 
its Article 99 discretion. 90  In his first report to the Council on troop deployment in the Congo in 
1960, Dag Hamarskjöld went even further, contending that the deteriorating situation in the 
country was “a threat to peace and security justifying United Nations intervention.”91  Notably, 
this “implied finding” comprised a “main element… from a legal point of view” for the 
argument for intervention. 92  The Council had not yet made such a finding, and would not do so 
until nine months later, well after the General Assembly had already raised a peacekeeping force.  
It might appear that Hamarskjöld effectively usurped the Council’s authority in making this 
public, ostensibly objective finding of legal import.   
¶42 Ultimately, though, such language proved to be rhetoric lacking legal consequence.  In the 
face of the Council’s continuing inaction, the General Assembly did not invoke the use of force 
based on the Secretary-General’s “finding.”93  Hamarskjöld himself later noted that the license 
provided by Article 99 is simply to “engage in informal diplomatic activity in regard to matters 
which may threaten international peace and security.”94   
¶43 The U.N.’s other organs have little in the way of legally-ordained recourse in checking 
Council action under Article 39.  As such, the U.N. system is deprived of a useful check 
common to emergency systems.  The resulting accountability gap suggests the need for 
heightened constraints through other channels.  Though the Council has demonstrated an 
adherence to constitutionalism in its prior practice, its good faith is an inadequate guarantor.   
2. Legalism Absent Justiciability 
¶44 Amongst the international legal community, it is widely accepted that a Council 
determination or inaction under Article 39 (as opposed to the exercise of powers thereafter) is 
nonjusticiable.  W. Michael Reisman has noted that the term “threat to the peace” has “prove[n] 
to be quite elastic in the hands of the Council,” making a judicial review function “somewhat 
                                                 
87 U.N. Charter arts. 97-98. 
88 For instance, in Somalia, Boutros-Ghali’s reports persuaded the Council that an Article 39 determination was in 
order given the inadequacy of non-military measures and the “repercussions of the Somali conflict on the entire 
region.” U.N. Doc. S/24859 (Nov. 24, 1992); U.N. Doc. S/24868 (Nov. 29, 1992); S.C. Res. 794, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992). 
89 U.N. Charter art. 99 (emphasis added); see also Kofi Annan, Foreword, in SECRETARY OR GENERAL? THE UN 
SECRETARY-GENERAL IN WORLD POLITICS xi (Simon Chesterman ed., 2007). 
90 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/96/Rev.7, at 5 (Dec. 1982); see also Ian 
Johnstone, The Role of the UN Secretary-General: The Power of Persuasion Based on Law, 9 Global Governance 
441, 443 (2003). 
91 U.N. Doc. S/4389 (Jul. 18, 1960) (quoted in  FRANCK (1995), supra  note 14, at 226-27.) 
92 Id. 
93 Hamarskjöld’s declaration in fact mentioned the “explicit request” of the Congolese government, suggesting that 
it was not any invocation of Chapter VII stemming from his statement, but rather this consent, that was dispositive 
in the matter.  Id. 
94 Dag Hamarskjöld, Lecture at Oxford University (30 May, 1961), in SERVANT OF PEACE : A SELECTION OF THE 
SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS OF DAG HAMARSKJÖLD 335 (William Foote ed., 1962). 
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difficult” in light of the absence of more manageable standards.95  Legal scholars presume the 
Council decision to be a political judgment “not properly suited to judicial examination” and 
unanswerable by reference to international law, despite the ubiquitous constraints posed by the 
purposes and principles of the organization. 96  The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) affirmed this principle in the Kanyabashi case.97 
¶45 Despite these concessions, the Council has not jettisoned its sense of legalism.  From the 
early consideration of the Franco regime to more recent attempts to characterize internal crises as 
international threats, the Council has evinced a juridical perception of its responsibilities and 
powers under Article 39.  Yet the Council has at times been remiss in its adherence to standards 
established by its early practice, and has slowly moved away from those standards.  Indeed, 
Council action under Article 39 has evolved both procedurally and substantively, shedding 
procedural rigor and precision at the expense of clarity and accountability.   
i) The Spanish Question 
¶46 The “primitive” practice of the Council contains evidence of a deliberative body aware of 
its unfettered discretion, yet faithful to an approach espousing procedural and substantive 
standards.  In considering the Spanish Question in April 1946, the Security Council concluded 
that a determination under Article 39 constituted a “very sharp instrument” which must “not [be] 
blunted or used in any way which would strain the intentions of the Charter or which would not 
be applicable in all similar cases.”98  In its seven months of consideration of whether the Franco 
regime represented a threat to international peace and security, the Council established several 
important principles in operationalizing Article 39.  These principles can be summarized as 
internationality, viability and immediacy.    
¶47 Seeking to sever diplomatic relations with the Franco regime multilaterally, Poland 
originally brought the matter to the Council under Article 35 with the support of France, Mexico 
and the USSR. 99  In supporting its claim that the regime constituted a threat to the peace, Poland 
argued that the threat was not only international (as opposed to “purely domestic”), but also 
ongoing and proximate, describing the technological advances and machinery of the Spanish 
army as well as its massing military forces near the French border.100  In so arguing, two 
                                                 
95 W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 83, 92 (1993). 
96 See Peter Malanczuk, Reconsidering the Relationship between the ICJ and the Security Council, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HAGUE’S 750TH ANNIVERSARY 87, 98 (Wybo Heere ed., 1999); see  Dapo Akande, 
The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is There Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the 
Political Organs of the United Nations? , 46 INT’L & COMP . L.Q. 309, 338 (1997); see DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE 
AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER: LEGAL LIMITS AND THE ROLE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 266 (2001). 
97 Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, Decision on Defense Motion, ¶ 20 (June 18, 1997) 
(noting that the Council “has a wide margin of discretion in deciding when and where there exists a threat to 
international peace and security,” a matter “not justiciable since [it] involve[s] the consideration of a number of 
social, political and circumstantial factors which cannot be weighed and balanced objectively” by a court of law);  
see also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) (Prov. Measures), 1993 I.C.J. 439 (1993) (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht) (the 
Court has no “right…to substitute its discretion for that of the Security Council”). 
98 Report of the Sub-Committee on the Spanish Question Appointed by the Security Council on 29 April 1946 , U.N. 
Doc. S/75 at 11 (¶ 21) (June 1, 1946). 
99 To this end, Poland claimed that the fascist government in Spain presented not only a problem “of the past,” but 
also a “serious problem of the present” as it continued to “serve the purpose of the Axis” and act as a “centre of 
fascist infection.” U.N. SCOR, 1st Ser., 34th mtg. at 159 (1946). 
100 Id. at 159, 162. 
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substantive criteria implicitly emerged: that the threat be international in nature, and that it exist 
at the time of the determination. 
¶48 The subsequent deliberations occurred in a litigative fashion, and revealed a keen 
awareness of constitutional limitations.  Although Poland posed the question in the political 
sense—“the problem is…how shall we carry into action this desire…which…we all share?”101—
the legal nature of the discussion cannot be disregarded.  Australia, echoing similar sentiments, 
laid out the burden of proof in succinct fashion:   
Prima facie, then, this question is one of domestic jurisdiction…First, is it a 
matter of international concern and not merely of domestic jurisdiction?  
Secondly, is the situation a cause of international friction?  If the answer to that 
question is affirmative, the following question arises: Thirdly, is it endangering 
international peace and security?  If the answer to these questions is negative, we 
can take no further action.  If the answer is affirmative, then, and then only, can 
this Council decide what can and should be done.102 
¶49 Further statements by delegations, particularly the lengthy record offered by the USSR, 
belie a purely political entity, instead suggesting a very juridical nature to its operations.103  
When China demanded that the threat to the peace would have to be “positively established… 
beyond a doubt,”104 it did so not as a political body, but as a Council member wary of the need 
for legality and process in determinations under Article 39. 
¶50 Despite political support for the Polish draft resolution, the Council hesitated, and instead 
chose to “make further studies to determine whether the situation in Spain has led to 
international friction and does endanger international peace and security.”105  Only if the 
appointed Sub-Committee returned with an affirmative answer would the Council then consider 
what “practical measures” to take.  In its report, the Sub-Committee found “as a matter of fact” 
the fascist nature of the regime, its continued persecution of political opponents, and the 
“international friction” caused by its large army and closed border with France.”106  However, it 
found no evidence of preparations for aggression, and pointed out that moral condemnation, in 
and of itself, could not be equated with a threat to the peace.107  The Council also found that any 
threat that Spain might pose was not immediate.  After deciding that recourse to substantial 
powers could not be had without the justification of an imminent threat to the international order, 
the Council determined that no threat to the peace had been “establish[ed].”108   
¶51 In many respects, not making a determination under Article 39 best illuminates the 
Council’s constitutional intent.  The Council took a legal approach in its deliberations, putting 
the burden of persuasion on those arguing for action under Article 39.  It referenced substantive 
criteria, such as the immediacy and “international” character of the threat, and an “independent 
body” investigated the factual record to review the validity and force of the arguments.  It also 
                                                 
101 Id. 37th mtg. at 228. 
102 Id. 35th mtg. at 194-96. 
103 Id. at 185-92.   
104 Id. at 199. 
105 S.C. Res 4 (Apr. 29, 1946). 
106 Report of the Sub-Committee on the Spanish Question Appointed by the Security Council on 29 April 1946  at 4, 
7. 
107 Id. at 7-10. 
108 Id. at 12; U.N. SCOR 1st year, 1st ser., No. 2, 44th mtg. at 322 (June 6, 1946). 
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utilized a measured procedure in its deliberations, tending towards gradual consideration of an 
item, providing offending entities with notice and an opportunity to avoid facing exceptional 
Council measures.  In its consideration of the Spanish Question, the Council created a promising 
mechanism for the accountable and principled determination of a threat to the peace.   
ii) Article 39 “Jurisprudence”: Limits and Process 
¶52 In the years that followed, Article 39 “jurisprudence” moved away from the self- limiting 
process first espoused by the Council.  The Greek Frontier Incidents Question represents the first 
pivotal case in a vaunted history of Council efforts to avoid binding constraints on its Article 39 
decision-making power.  In discussing the matter, the Council again employed a fact- finding 
commission to report on the Greek complaint lodged in December 1946, but following a Soviet 
veto, failed to adopt its conclusion that the “support of armed bands” amounted to a threat to the 
peace.109  This occurred even though the wording in the resolution was a compromise, with its 
sponsor’s emphatic asterisk that the language would not in any way bind the Council in the 
future.110  Such rewording was necessary in light of objections to the originally worded amended 
draft resolution, which drew the ire of Council members who felt that it in effect bound them to a 
particular definition of “threat to the peace.”111   
¶53 The Council continues to avoid limiting its discretion in a calculated fashion, though it 
now does so explicitly, most frequently in its resolutions, by highlighting the uniqueness or 
particularity of the circumstances.112  This “ad hocism” prevents the emergence of precedent and 
allows the Council to avoid predetermined triggers.  Nonetheless, the Council’s awareness of the 
precedential value of its words demonstrates its continuing attention to legalism.  Indeed, as the 
admitted violation of customary law is widely considered the best evidence of the existence of 
that law, so too must the Council’s noted awareness of the legal effects of its resolutions suggest 
that its political discretion ultimately remains confined to a juridical system. 
¶54 The Council response to the Sharpeville Massacre in South Africa provides further 
evidence of the “legality” of Article 39.  Following the deaths of sixty-nine black protesters, 
twenty-nine African and Asian countries together brought the situation before the Council under 
Article 35.  The preliminary discussion centered on whether the situation constituted a threat to 
the peace, echoing prior deliberations in its back-and-forth regarding the domesticity of the 
situation and Member State proffers to the contrary.  Some Council members argued that the 
threat was not in the violent incident that had already taken place, but in the likelihood that 
continuing repression of human rights and violence would be met by African nationalism and 
violent responses across the continent.113  The Tunisian representative referred to the “precedent” 
set by the Council deliberations during the Spanish Question, noting that ostensibly internal 
affairs can amount to a threat to international peace.114    
                                                 
109 U.N. Doc. S/486 (Aug. 12, 1947), quoted in LELAND GOODRICH & ANNE SIMONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, 355 (1977). 
110 See U.N. SCOR, 2nd year, 147th mtg. at 1123-24 (U.S.); 158th mtg. at 1322-23 (Colo m.); 164th mtg. at 1454-70. 
111 U.N. Doc. S/429 (July 22, 1947).  
112 Thus, the Council justified its Chapter VII authority in Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia, the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia and elsewhere by preambular reference to “the unique and exceptional circumstances” prevailing in 
those countries.  See S.C. Res. 841, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (June 16, 1993); S.C. Res. 917, U.N. Doc. S/RES/917 
(May 6, 1994); S.C. Res. 940, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 
1993); S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992) (“recognizing the unique character of the present 
situation” in Somalia). 
113 U.N. SCOR, 15th year, 852nd mtg., at 9, 15, 28, U.N. Doc. S/PV.852 (Mar. 30, 1960). 
114 U.N. SCOR, 15th year, 851st mtg., at 22, U.N. Doc. S/PV.851 (Mar. 30, 1960) (Tunis.). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [ 2 0 0 7  
 
 42 
¶55 In summary, early Council practice was a mixed bag.  It offered glimpses of process and 
procedural mechanisms, and established certain very basic substantive criteria.  At the same 
time, any comprehensive system within the matters involving Article 39 is hard to locate, and 
Council aversion to binding criteria has only perpetuated inconsistent practice.  Still, the legalism 
with which the Council approached Article 39 must be noted.  Far from any realist perceptions of 
a political sovereign acting outside of the law, Council deliberations and actions depict a salient 
appreciation of the legal space in which the Council operated, even as Chapter VII nears and 
tangible rules dissipate.   
iii) Chinks in the Armor: Growing Incoherence in Council Practice 
¶56 The concern that political discretion does not beget political fiat also must extend to the 
Security Council.  The political component of Council action cannot be disputed; the Council 
must inevitably take into account the Member States’ willingness and ability to contribute, and it 
has acted more vociferously in response to greater political threats.115  Still, the Council has 
approached its task in a juristic fashion, with its Charter- imposed limits in mind.  As demands on 
the Council have grown, though, more robust Council action alongside more deft political 
compromise have led to greater inconsistency and ambiguity in practice.  Article 39 
determinations made in under-determined form create the potential for the exercise of power by 
Council fiat, mirroring the slippery slope that many countries facing “permanent emergencies” 
have fallen down.  As the Council faces threats “of a kind, or an order of magnitude, entirely 
different from those envisaged by the Charter’s authors,”116 the “living” Charter must adapt as 
well. 
¶57 The Council has long resisted endorsing binding criteria of any potency.  This has stunted 
the uniformity of its practice, preventing both the development of objective triggers for invoking 
Article 39 and the categorical exclusion of specific situations from Article 39 qualification.  
Were such minimal objective triggers in place, the Council would have had difficulty finding 
that regime changes in Haiti117and Sierra Leone 118 constituted threats to the peace.  This lack of 
consistent binding criteria has also led the Council to make Article 39 determinations that fail to 
conform to the principle that threats to international peace and security must be proximate, if no t 
immediate. 119  For example, the Council has made Article 39 determinations in seemingly 
retroactive fashion, as in the case of Libyan non-compliance with American and British requests 
for extradition of the suspected Pan-Am Flight 103 bombers.120   
                                                 
115 CHESTERMAN (2001), supra note 70, at 153 (remarking on the Council response to the “political threat” posed by 
the Haitian crisis in 1993). 
116 Thomas Franck, Collective Security and UN Reform: Between the Necessary and the Possible, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
597, 601 (2006). 
117 S.C. Res. 841, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (June 16, 1993); S.C. Res. 917, U.N. Doc. S/RES/917 (May 6, 1994); S.C. 
Res. 940, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994). 
118 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (Oct. 8, 1997); S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 
1999); S.C. Res. 1289, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1289 (Feb. 7, 2000). 
119 Bernhard Graefrath, Leave to the Court What Belongs to the Court: The Libyan Case, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 184, 196 
(1993) (“It remains absolutely unclear why or how the failure to renunciate terrorism … or the failure to surrender 
suspects, or the refusal of compensation claims which are not established under any legal procedure, could constitute 
a threat to the peace.”) 
120 Some academics, however, would champion certain Article 39 determinations that did not involve immediate 
threats.  They propose that the Council adopt prospective criteria mandating an Article 39 determination.  Of note is 
the acclaimed doctrine put forward by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
in The Responsibility to Protect (R2P).  Noted by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan with approval, R2P put 
forward several thresholds of “just cause” including the large scale loss of human life and large scale ethnic 
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¶58 More alarming Council positions are those that arise simply out of “diplomatic 
carelessness.”  Consider, for instance, the reasoning behind Article 39 determinations offered in 
Council resolutions.  Within domestic emergency systems, a common validating measure has 
been a notification regimen requiring justification given at both the international, and sometimes 
domestic, level.  The Council, however, has not adopted this principle with any semblance of 
exactitude.  Admittedly, some resolutions do more than others.  In Resolution 1521 concerning 
Liberia, the Council went out of its way to determine that beyond the mere “situation,” “the 
proliferation of arms and armed non-State actors, including mercenaries, in the sub-region 
continue[s] to constitute a threat to international peace and security in West Africa, in particular 
to the peace process in Liberia.”121  In other resolutions, however, such as those establishing the 
United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) and the U.N. Operation in Côte d’Ivoire 
(UNOCI), the Council has, following wide-ranging and unfocused preambles, quite laconically 
“determine[ed]” or “not[ed]” that the country “situation” constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security. 122  This imprecision not only hinders the appropriate confinement of Chapter 
VII authority, but also indicates larger transparency deficits in Council practice.   
¶59 Despite a slant in the Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure towards publicity and 
transparency, 123 in recent years resolutions invoking Article 39 and Chapter VII more generally 
have been constructed outside of public purview in informal consultations, with formal meetings 
acting as “mere ceremonial events, typically of very short duration.”124  W. Michael Reisman has 
referred to this phenomenon as a “parliamentary matryoshka (doll),” containing “ever-smaller 
‘mini-Councils,’ each meeting behind closed doors without keeping records, and each taking 
decisions secretly.”125  Such opacity only amplifies the disquietude caused by textually 
unreasoned Article 39 determinations.   
¶60 The synergy of this “opacity effect” extends to the imprecise and inconsistent Article 39 
terminology employed by the Council in its resolutions.  In many cases, the Council utilizes the 
vernacular of Article 39 without explicit reference to Chapter VII.  In such cases, a threat to the 
peace is determined, but it is unclear whether it has the legal effect of an Article 39 
determination.  For instance, the Council has, without reference to Chapter VII, expressed grave 
concern towards the situation in the Cyprus which “has led to a serious threat to international 
peace and security, 126 as well as the situation in the Congo which “seriously imperil[s] peace and 
order…of the Congo, and threaten[s] international peace and security.”127   
                                                                                                                                                             
cleansing.  Though the restrictive nature of such malleable terms is limited absent further refinement, to some R2P 
poses the threat of binding Article 39 triggers; to others, it represents further license to take an expansive notion of 
Article 39 and in so doing disregard Article 2(7).  In 2006, the Council for the first time endorsed the R2P standards, 
“reaffirming” paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document which covered the topic, and later 
referenced this responsibility to protect (i.e., resolution 1674) in a Chapter VII resolution regarding Sudan.  Whether 
R2P can be integrated into Council practice in a prospective fashion, or continues as a mere post hoc rationalization, 
remains to be seen.  International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
(2001), http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf.; S.C. Res. 1674, ¶4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 
2006); S.C. Res. 1706, ¶2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006). 
121 S.C. Res. 1521. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1521 (Dec. 21, 2003). 
122 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1545, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1545 (May 21, 2004); see also S.C. Res. 1528, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1528 (Feb. 27, 2004). 
123 See Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, supra  note 90, at 9-10. 
124 James O.C. Jonah, Differing State Perspectives on the United Nations in the Post-Cold War Perspective, ACUNS 
Reports and papers No. 4, 11 (1993). 
125 Reisman, supra note 95, at 85-86. 
126 S.C. Res. 353, U.N. Doc. S/RES/353 (Jul. 20, 1974) (emphasis added). 
127 S.C. Res. 161, U.N. Doc. S/RES/161 (Feb. 21, 1961). 
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¶61 Conversely, the Council has also acted under Chapter VII without any reference to Article 
39, or threats to international peace and security.  Under Resolutions 1422 and 1487 granting 
peace operations personnel immunity from International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecution, the 
Council in the preambular paragraphs of the resolutions simply states that “it is in the interests of 
international peace and security to facilitate Member States’ ability to contribute” to U.N. peace 
operations.128  As discussed in later Sections, these resolutions illustrate a blurring of the lines 
between normalcy and exception similar to that witnessed in domestic emergency systems, as the 
Council uses exceptional powers to legislate in non-exceptional circumstances and bypasses 
legitimating constitutional mechanisms.     
¶62 The differences in language are not a simple matter of semantics.  Resolution 660 
following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait included not only an explicit determination, but also 
specifically referenced Article 39 (as well as Article 40) as the basis for its actions.129  Less than 
one year later, Resolution 688 noted that the flow of refugees across international borders 
threatened international peace and security, but omitted reference to Chapter VII.130  Thus, it was 
unclear whether or not the “safe zones” established thereafter to allow for humanitarian access 
were legitimately created under the Council’s exceptional powers.  Similarly, when Resolution 
447 was passed to condemn South Africa’s sustained armed invasions of Angola launched from 
“illegally occupied” Namibia, it remained unclear whether in fact the resolution was adopted 
under Chapter VII.131 
¶63 This problem emerges not only in the construction of the Article 39 determination, but also 
in its application to the operative paragraphs of the resolution.  Article 39 determinations, and the 
subsequent “Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter…” tagline, are too often applied by the 
Council in blanket and under-determined form.  When this occurs, the scope of the Chapter VII 
state of exception becomes unclear, and principles of proportionality and necessity are called into 
question.   
¶64 In rare instances, the Council makes a concerted effort to draft a clear and refined 
resolution under Chapter VII.132  The Council has also specified its Chapter VII powers by 
compartmentalizing resolutions, dividing them broadly into a Chapter VI section and a Chapter 
VII section. 133  More commonly, Article 39 determinations and subsequent Chapter VII 
                                                 
128 S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (Jul. 12, 2002); S.C. Res. 1487, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487 (Jun. 12, 2003) 
(emphasis added). 
129 S.C. Res. 660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990). 
130 S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (Apr. 5, 1991). 
131 S.C. Res. 447, ¶1, U.N.Doc. S/RES/447 (Mar. 28, 1979)(stating that the actions as well as the Apartheid regime 
itself “constitute[d] … a serious threat to international peace and security”).  The British delegation emphasized that 
the operative paragraphs did not “constitut[e] determinations under the Charter,” while the Soviet delegation 
implicitly interpreted the resolution in the same way by lamenting the lack of decisive measures under Chapter VII. 
Though it has been suggested that, lacking circumstantial evidence of Chapter VII intent, such resolutions should be 
interpreted narrowly and not be regarded as a determination under Article 39. One must question whether 
interpretive canons like this will be embraced so universally as to constitute an authoritative judgment.  U.N. SCOR, 
34th year, 2139th mtg., at ¶¶34-38, 56 (Mar. 28, 1979); See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A 
COMMENTARY, supra note 70, at 727. 
132 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1493, ¶¶25-27, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1493 (July 28, 2003)(specifying different levels of 
enforcement power for MONUC in the Kivu and Ituri regions); ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS 
2006 75 (Ian Johnstone ed., 2006) [hereinafter Annual Review 2006].   
133 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 918, U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (May 17, 1994) (referring to mission expansion in Part A and to 
the Chapter VII arms embargo in Part B); see also  S.C. Res.1564, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564 (18 Sept, 204) (applying 
Chapter VII only to that part of the MINUSTAH mandate covered in ¶7(I)); and  S.C. Res. 814, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/814 (March 26, 1993) (addressing humanitarian issues in Part A, and issues relating to the use of force in 
Part B). 
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authorizations are applied in blanket fashion to broad mandates.  In Resolution 1545 regarding 
ONUB, only the preamble referenced Chapter VII explicitly, but paragraph 5 authorized ONUB 
to use “all necessary means” to carry out an incredibly broad mandate, including activities 
ranging from disarmament to civilian protection to elections.  In so doing, it did not specify 
whether Chapter VII was applicable only to those “usual suspects” involving force, or if it 
similarly applied to the operation’s peacebuilding functions.  The Council similarly offered a 
vague Chapter VII authorization for the unprecedented transitional administrations in Kosovo 
and East Timor.  Under Resolution 1272, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET) was established under a broad, unreasoned preambular Chapter VII 
authorization. 134  In Kosovo, Resolution 1244, adopted under Chapter VII, proceeded without 
further refinement to describe both a military and civilian component to the multilateral 
intervention, under different flags (NATO and the UN) and with sharply divergent tasks.  No 
guidance was offered in ascertaining how and to which functions Chapter VII would apply.  135  
Such directives erode the boundary between Chapters VI and VII. 
E. Blurring the Lines  
1. Domestically 
¶65 As governments disregard the rationale behind exception and opportunistically resort to 
emergency powers instead of the regular channels of action conforming to more exacting liberal 
standards, the distinction between emergency and regular governance is obscured.  Where this 
occurs and procedural mechanisms become mere formalities, states of emergency become 
permanent and little more than an excuse to forgo the niceties of constitutional checks on 
governmental action.  Distinct governmental allocations of jurisdiction are encroached upon, and 
the legislative process is devitalized.  More often than not, the “insidious outcome” of this 
situation “is the tendency to slide into a new conception of normality that takes vastly extended 
controls for granted, and thinks of freedom in smaller and smaller dimensions.”136 
¶66 The erosion of boundaries transpires in several interconnected ways.  Emergencies can 
become entrenched in a temporal sense, as renewal and extension mechanisms are often less 
procedurally rigorous, both de jure and de facto.  Egypt, for example, has been under emergency 
rule since 1958 under Emergency Law No. 162.137  In Swaziland, a state of emergency has 
persisted for over thirty years; in Malaysia, for thirty-seven, and in Syria, over forty. 138  Limiting 
mechanisms have often proven ineffective in the face of executive will.  In Malaysia, a 
                                                 
134 S.C. Res. 1272, ¶2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct 25, 1999) (granting an “all necessary means” allowance to carry 
out functions as varied as “law and order,” “sustainable development” and “humanitarian assistance).  
135 S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). 
136 HAROLD LASSWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 29 (1950). 
137 Human Rights Watch, In the Name of Counterterrorism: Human Rights Abuses Worldwide (2003) 
http://hrw.org/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-bck.htm (briefing paper for the 59th session of the U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights). 
138 See John Daniel, Countries at the Crossroads 2005,Country Report: Swaziland, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/modules/publications/ccr/modPrintVersion.cfm?edition=2&ccrpage=8&ccrcountry=9
8 (last visited March 22, 2007);  David Lesch, Countries at the Crossroads 2005, Country Report: Syria, FREEDOM 
HOUSE, 
HTTP://www.freedomhouse.org/modules/publications/ccr/modPrintVersion.cfm?edition=2&ccrpage=8&ccrcountry=
106 (last visited Feb. 21, 2007); Sahr Muhammed Ally, Convicted Before trial: Indefinite Detention under 
Malaysia’s Emergency Ordinance,  http://hrw.org/reports/2006/malaysia0806/index.htm (last visited March 22, 
2007). 
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government-appointed Royal Commission stated in 2005 that the emergency law “ha[d] outlived 
its purpose” and was continuing simply to “[facilitate] the abuse of fundamental liberties.”139  
Still, no change has occurred, as the Malaysian constitution bars judicial review of proclamations 
of emergency and their continuation. 140  Elsewhere, though judicial review is nominally 
available, scrutiny of the duration of emergency has been a rarity, with courts instead “regarding 
each derogation case as a singular exception.”141  Insulated and objective judicial review has not 
been replaced by political willpower.     
¶67 The invocation of emergency in the face of less-than-dire circumstances has also confused 
its boundaries.  The notion of emergency has spread from an initially security-oriented concept 
to an economic one, devaluing the term.  It is the task of the law to ensure that the exceptional 
powers of emergency do not become a means by which authorities attempt to cut corners of 
governance.  Chapter VII presents a similar challenge. 
2. When, to What, and Where Does an Article 39 Determination Apply? 
¶68 The normalization and expansion of exception can be seen on the international plane as 
well. Chapter VII has kept pace with, if not outpaced, the general increase in Council action 
across the board.  In the first forty-four years of the Council’s existence, “[twenty-four] Security 
Council resolutions cited or used the terms of Chapter VII; by 1993 it was adopting that many 
such resolutions every year.”142  In 2005 this number rose to thirty-nine.  In 2006, no fewer than 
forty-two Council resolutions cited Chapter VII.   
¶69 Such expansion has increasingly blurred the lines between the traditional pacific dispute 
settlement functions of Chapter VI and the enforcement actions of Chapter VII, euphemistically 
captured in the term “Chapter Six and a Half.”143  While during the Cold War a sharp line was 
drawn between traditional peacekeeping under Chapter VI and enforcement action under Chapter 
VII, the nature and complexity of post-Cold War peace operations has often required a hybrid 
form of peace enforcement, despite Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s recognition that 
“to blur the distinction between the two can undermine the viability of the peace-keeping 
operation and endanger its personnel.”144  Boutros-Ghali did attempt to reinforce the distinction 
and depict the Chapters as “alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum,”145 
but that attempt was undermined by the Brahimi Report, which suggested the distinction between 
the two was misleading and emphasized the need “to project credible force.”146  Where the 
terminology of Article 39 and Chapter VII is interchangeably used and omitted from resolutions, 
the U.N. extracts its arguable deterrent effect at the expense of constitutional validity.   
¶70 Moreover, inconsistent language in drafting leaves even Council members wondering 
whether Chapter VII has actually been invoked.  In 1992, China abstained from voting for 
                                                 
139 Id. 
140 Constitution of Malaysia, Part XI, art. 8(b) (1963). 
141 See GROSS & NÍ AOLÁIN, supra note 17, at 282-84; see also Aksoy v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553, 587 (1996). 
142 CHESTERMAN (2001), supra note 70, at 121. 
143 A term first coined by Dag Hamarskjöld. Kofi Annan, UN Peacekeping Operations and Cooperation with Nato  
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1993/9305-1.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2007). 
144 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary -General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/50/60—S/1995/1, ¶¶35-36 (Jan. 3, 1995). 
145 Id. at ¶36. 
146 A phrase itself emblematic of the blurred distinction between force and non-force. Annual Review 2006, supra 
note 132, at 10-11 (citing Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, ¶¶ 21,48, 50-51, delivered to the 
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/55/305 (Aug. 21, 2000)). 
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Resolution 776, which sought to provide the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with the 
capacity to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid.  Though no explicit language appeared, 
China, preferring a traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping mission, believed that the resolution 
implicitly invoked Chapter VII through its reference back to the prior Chapter VII Resolution 
770.147  Where uncertainty ascends to the highest veto-holding Council members, the resolutions 
surely cannot be said to conform to the principle of notice central to emergency systems.   
¶71 Mandate resolutions are especially prone to inconsistent drafting.  Though some 
resolutions clarify the contours of the situation—for instance, by enumerating and affirming 
prior resolutions “except as expressly changed” within the resolution in question148—many 
resolutions, particularly relating to mandate evolution, fail in this respect.  Missions go through 
several iterations of title, command structure and authorization, ostensibly reflecting the evolving 
situation on the ground.  While resolutions authorizing a new mandate theoretically serve to 
tailor response measures so that they remain proportional to and necessary in light of the relevant 
threat, often such resolutions do not properly signal the cessation of Chapter VII status; they 
thereby create a situation in which mandate evolution does more to obscure the status of 
operations than to define it.  The inconsistency and ambiguity of “re-hatting” resolutions in 
restating the applicability of Chapter VII raises the question of whether such authorizations 
continue on or are eventually annulled tacitly, subject to revocation by some form of desuetude.  
Though the threat of the “reverse veto,” blocking the termination of a Chapter VII 
authorization, 149 has impacted this practice considerably, it cannot explain the capricious, if not 
incoherent, way in which the Council has denoted an operation’s level of authorization.   
¶72 As an example, Resolution 1706, expanding the U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), 
explicitly restates the Article 39 determination and its Chapter VII authorization, while 
relegating the latter to a subset of the mandate.150  Similarly, in Côte d’Ivoire, the resolution 
establishing the U.N. operation (UNOCI) and allocating authority between it and existing French 
and ECOWAS forces restates the Chapter VII invocation.  It also expressly limits, for a matter of 
months, the force authorization given to these partners.151  In contrast, resolutions regarding UN 
activities in Sierra Leone do not maintain consistent authorization language.  After one resolution 
explicitly invoked Chapter VII authority in revising the mandate of the UNAMSIL mission in 
Sierra Leone, later resolutions extending the UNAMSIL mandate made no mention of Chapter 
VII until its final extension. 152  At the same time, resolutions pertaining to the Special Court in 
Sierra Leone and conflict diamonds included an explicit Chapter VII authorization, raising the 
question of Chapter VII’s continuing applicability to the broad UNAMSIL mandate.153  
                                                 
147 S.C. Res. 776, U.N. Doc. S/RES/776 (Sept. 14, 1992); see also CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
USE OF FORCE  218 (2d ed., 2004). 
148 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 687, ¶1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991). 
149 David Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 552, 577 
(1993). 
150 S.C. Res. 1706, ¶12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006); see also S.C. Res 1590, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1590 
(Mar. 24, 2005) (establishing UNMIS). 
151 S.C. Res. 1528, ¶8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1528 (Feb. 27, 2004); see also S.C. Res. 1464, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1464 
(Feb. 4, 2003) (authorizing ECOWAS and French forces under Chapter VII to “take the necessary steps to 
guarantee” security and freedom of movement for their forces and civilians). 
152 S.C. Res.  1270, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999) (establishing UNAMSIL); S.C. Res. 1289, ¶10, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1289 (Feb. 7, 2000) (modifying mandate); S.C. Res. 1306, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1306 (July 5, 2000) 
(extending mandate with no Chapter VII reference); see also S.C. Res. 1334, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1334 (Dec. 22, 
2000); S.C. Res. 1346, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1346 (March 30, 2001); S.C. Res 1400, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1400 (March 28, 
2002). 
153 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1385, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1385 (Dec. 19, 2001) (Chapter VII resolution on conflict diamonds); 
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¶73 Whether the status of a resolution can be determined solely by explicit reference to Chapter 
VII, or if reference back to prior Chapter VII resolutions suffices, is a contested point.  This 
opacity in practice, in turn, leaves actors with little certainty as to whether Chapter VII is still in 
force.  Such uncertainty creates room for the unnecessary extension of Chapter VII authority, 
which, in light of the normative exceptionalism it engenders and the prima facie legitimacy it 
endows (discussed further in following Sections), can facilitate unaccountable and illegitimate 
action on behalf of the Council and Council-authorized actors.  This is particularly the case as 
peace operations trend towards longer tenures with enduring authorizations that recognize the 
propensity of post-conflict regions to relapse.154  
¶74 Carelessness in this respect can provide actors with a specious legal argument for later 
action under Chapter VII, as was the case in Iraq.  Following the Iraqi acceptance of ceasefire 
terms after the “Gulf War,” the Council invoked Chapter VII in Resolution 687, declaring the 
ceasefire effective while extending sanctions and establishing a body to supervise the destruction 
of proscribed weapons (UNSCOM).155  As discontent with Iraqi compliance reached a tipping 
point over ten years later, the Council passed Resolution 1441 under Chapter VII, referencing the 
earlier resolutions in a manner suggestive of an ongoing and continuous Chapter VII 
authorization and deciding that Iraq remained in “material breach” of its obligations, primarily 
under Resolution 687.156  In light of Council practice, the question of whether the invocation of 
Chapter VII, or the authorization to use force there under, had become entrenched is uncertain.157  
The matter remained on the Council agenda under the same title through 2005, and intervening 
resolutions invoked Chapter VII referencing their relation to earlier Chapter VII resolutions, 
particularly 687.158  Absent clearer and more consistent practice, the lingering import of Chapter 
VII in the situation is at best uncertain.   
¶75 The case of Iraq demonstrates the very real dangers inherent in the Council’s calculated 
negligence.  Without clearer temporal limits to the invocation of Chapter VII, as well as 
predictable (if not legally operative) practice, the resulting uncertainty can transcend the realm of 
semantics.  In Iraq, it led to the loss of Council control, and provided the legal foundation 
necessary to galvanize a “Coalition of the Willing.”   
¶76 A cursory glance at the Council agenda further emphasizes the tendency towards 
entrenchment of situations in which Chapter VII has been invoked.  In remaining actively seized 
of a matter, the Council can stay apprised of a situation and act quickly when necessary; it can 
also prevent the General Assembly from acting on the matter.159 This logic is analogous to that of 
the domestic emergency, wherein the emergency is prolonged to centralize authority in the acting 
body, typically the executive.  Though the Council has explicitly “concluded its consideration” 
of an item and removed it from the list of matters of which the Council is seized,160 it has done so 
infrequently, and matters have remained on the Council’s agenda for extended periods of time.161   
                                                                                                                                                             
S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) (Chapter VII resolution pertaining to the Special Court). 
154 Roughly half of all countries emerging from conflict relapse into violence within five years.  See United Nations 
Department of Public Information, 2005 World Summit: Securing a Dangerous World, available at 
http://www.un.org/summit2005/presskit/Peace.pdf. 
155 S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/REC/687 (Apr. 3, 1991). 
156 S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002). 
157 S.C. Res. 687, supra note 157, ¶ 34 (concluding the Council would “remain seized” of the matter and take 
“further steps” to “secure peace and security in the region”). 
158 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1154, ¶¶3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1154 (Mar. 2, 1998); S.C. Res. 1284, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284  
(Dec. 17, 1999). 
159 U.N. Charter art. 11; Certain Expenses, supra note 116, at 176-77. 
160 S.C. Res. 1506 ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1506 (Sept. 12, 2003) (concluding consideration of the Libyan situation, 
Vol. 6:1] Jared Schott 
 49 
¶77 Perhaps with an eye towards eliminating such agenda stalwarts, the current working 
methods of the Council provide for the “automatic” deletion of matters from the agenda which 
have not been considered in the preceding five years, unless a Council member contests the 
deletion—in which case the matter must be renewed annually.162  A period of five years, though, 
is a nontrivial amount of time.  What is more, the rule does not address the Council’s injudicious 
use of nomenclature.  Though Kuwait was quickly liberated from the Iraqi invasion in 1991 and 
largely irrelevant to later arms control issues, the Council continued to consider developments in 
Iraq under the general title “the situation between Iraq and Kuwait” until 2005, when it finally 
held informal consultations addressing the obsolete title.163  Such negligence contributes to the 
lack of clarity in assessing both the purpose and endpoint of Council responses to threats to the 
peace, and allows for the routinization of exception. 
F. Apportioning Limits 
¶78 Six decades of work has demonstrated that the Council will not be defined by its political 
nature.  Through its words and actions, it is evident that the Council acts in a juridical fashion, 
particularly when contemplating the determination of a threat to international peace and security.  
Still, by themselves the textual limits of the Charter have failed to ensure the valid invocation of 
Chapter VII.  Discordant Council practice has resulted in a blurring of the lines between the 
ordinary powers and functions allotted to the Council and those extraordinary powers reserved 
for situations constituting, at a minimum, threats to international peace and security.  The failure 
to use established criteria, the blanket and under-determined form in which Chapter VII is 
invoked, and the lack of transparency all cast doubt on whether contemporary Council 
resolutions provide a valid and constitutional basis for derogations from the ordinary. 
¶79 In pursuing the ideals of exception, domestic experience offers several insights.  The first 
advises against constructing a series of bulwarks to address the problem.  Political discretion is 
an integral component of the decision to enter into a state of exception.  Because of this, explicit 
substantive rules are rare in constitutional and statutory schemes, and judicial oversight has been 
deferential, with judges loathe to substitute their policy wisdom for that of the declaratory 
authority’s in the absence of more manageable standards.   
¶80 The domestic experience has shown that procedural limits on declaration are the more 
effective tool, acting as secondary rules to enforce higher constitutional standards.   With respect 
to constitutionalizing the unsound practice of the Council, several such checks stand out as 
potentially valuable safeguards.  The first is the need for the Council to provide actual notice of 
Article 39 determinations, and develop a factual record supporting those determinations in a 
manner inspired by the reporting requirements of the major international human rights 
instruments’ derogation clauses.  Determinations are now largely influenced or made within the 
closed confines of Council caucus meetings, and resolutions frequently fail to provide the 
                                                                                                                                                             
dating back to Dec. 1991). See also S.C. Res. 10 U.N. Doc. S/RES/10 (Nov. 4, 1946) (taking the Spanish Question 
off of the Council’s list). 
161 SYDNEY D. BAILEY, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 351 (1975) (listing several outdated 
matters). 
162 President of the Security Council, Handbook on the Working Methods of the Security Council ¶50 (Dec. 2006), 
annexed to U.N. Doc. S/2006/507 (July 19, 2006). 
163 The Council decided that “the situation between Iraq and Kuwait” would apply to issues relating to the return of 
Kuwaiti property, repatriation/return of Kuwaiti and third -country nationals (and their remains), and the U.N. 
Compensation Commission.  Other issues would be considered under the agenda item “The situation concerning 
Iraq.”  President of the Security Council , Note, U.N. S/2005/251 (Apr. 18, 2005). 
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reasoning behind an Article 39 determination.  This occurs despite the more thorough precedent 
set by the Council in its consideration of the Spanish Question, providing both a lengthy, 
publicly available deliberation of the issue, as well as a record in the form of the appointed Sub-
Committee’s report.  Full employment of the Council’s fact- finding powers under Article 34 
through the established use of commissions of inquiry before an Article 39 determination is 
made would satisfy these principles.  These commissions would provide an objective assessment 
of the situation, and additionally allow the Council to proffer a factual record for its decision.  
The greater use of commissions would also answer a pivotal question of institutional 
competence: how the Council can wield such discretion without an independent intelligence 
capacity.  Use of these independent commissions would, at least on an ad hoc basis, ensure 
accountable and objective factual bases for Council deliberation.   
¶81 The domestic experience in emergency also highlights the essential role clarity and 
transparency play in guaranteeing accountable action.  Perhaps the most significant procedural 
reform that may be gleaned from that experience is the consistent use of language regarding 
threats to, and breaches of, international peace and security.  With the normative implications of 
“Chapter Six and a half” now long established, calculated ambiguity no longer serves a purpose 
as applied to the terms of Article 39.  The vagaries of diplomatic compromise should not 
encroach on what is ultimately a binary decision—Chapter Six or Chapter Seven—but rather, if 
unavoidable, should be confined to the mandate proper.   
¶82 Clarity here is a multi- faceted proposition involving several changes.  The lexicon of 
Article 39 should be standardized, through resolution, Presidential Statement or amendment to 
the Rules of Procedure.  To be of legal effect, Article 39 determinations would have to explicitly 
reference either a threat to international peace and security, a breach thereof, or an act of 
aggression.  Any linguistic mimicry, such as “friction,” “endangers” or “continuance in time,” 
would have no legal effect, but could still prove useful in creating a gradual system of notice.  To 
further elucidate Council intent, resolutions should also specifically describe in a concise 
preambular statement the reasoning behind the Article 39 determination.  Further, the relevant 
body paragraphs of a resolution should explicitly invoke Chapter VII authorization and specify 
the provisions it applies to as well as the territorial or temporal limits to be observed.  These 
standardized practices would not infringe on the discretion of the Council, which would still be 
able to craft broad authorizations and powers.  Confinement to uniform terminology of legal 
effect would, however, highlight Council intentions and clarify the legal impact of resolutions, 
thereby augmenting the transparency and accountability of Council decisions. 
¶83 Clarity and consistency are similarly essential in resolutions pertaining to mandate 
evolution and termination.  Necessity and proportionality demand that the Council dynamically 
tailor its response to a situation as it unfolds to prevent Chapter VII from becoming a permanent 
fixture.  While there is certainly an incentive to lessen the length of operations in light of the 
paucity of resources at the macro- level, once an operation is established the operational 
flexibility and authority provided by Chapter VII authority has a “narcotic effect.”  
¶84 Recent Council experience with “smart sanctions” provides a model for clearer and more 
narrowly tailored practice.  Arising as a result of criticisms of the collateral damage to 
populations of targeted countries, attentive consideration of the problem has resulted in sanctions 
designed “in accordance with strict and objective criteria,” including “time frames, clear and 
precise objectives, accountability, periodic review and timely and objective assessment of the 
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effects of sanctions.”164  In addition to developing more narrowly tailored sanctions, the Council 
has affirmatively terminated or suspended sanctions measures using explicit language.165   
¶85 Involvement of the Secretary-General as an “objective trigger” for termination represents a 
second means through which to rein in Council discretion and limit the invocation of Chapter 
VII.  This approach has been previously used in both sanctions measures and peace operations.166  
In utilizing an objective trigger in a manner consistent with the Charter, the Council would avoid 
the intransigence and entrenchment associated with the threat of the reverse veto.  Such triggers 
would not only bind the Council to a pre-determined limit, but place the decision-making 
authority in an independent, objective and (ostensibly) politically- insulated body.  Moreover, 
increased use of objective and independent triggers could provide bright- line endpoints, both 
with respect to the termination of Chapter VII measures as well as the invocation more generally.   
¶86 Finally, the Council’s past successes in drafting clear and compartmentalized mandates 
could serve as templates for future drafting.  One such mandate endowed MONUC, operating in 
a complex environment, with a Chapter VII authorization in 2003.167  The mission had the typical 
blanket Chapter VII authority for the entire mandate, but under paragraphs 25 and 26 of the 
resolution, was endowed with full enforcement power in the region of Ituri, and more limited 
enforcement power “within its capabilities” in North and South Kivu, as well as for the 
protection of civilians.168  Resolution 1493 therefore presents a prime example of the ability of 
the Council to narrowly tailor a mandate to ensure the proportionality of its force authorizations 
through territorial limits.   
¶87 The Council has also specified its Chapter VII powers by compartmentalizing resolutions, 
dividing them broadly into a Chapter VI section and a Chapter VII section.  Thus, in Resolution 
918 regarding the situation in Rwanda, part “A” referred to the expansion of the U.N. Assistance 
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) without a Chapter VII authorization, while part “B” included an 
Article 39 determination in calling for the imposition of an arms embargo.169  In Resolution 814 
addressing humanitarian issues and mandate expansion in Somalia, part “A” once more outlined 
                                                 
164 Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the 
Organization ¶23, U.N. Doc. A/61/33 (supp.) (Jan. 1, 2006). See also President of the Security Council, Statement 
by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2006/28 (June 22, 2006). 
165 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1074 ¶2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1074 (Oct. 1, 1996). In lifting the sanctions against Libya arising 
from the Lockerbie incident, Resolution 1506 first recounted the steps taken to ostensibly eliminate the threat to the 
peace and subsequently enumerated the specific measures to be terminated “with immediate effect.”  It also 
explicitly dissolved the related sanctions committee and “concluded its consideration of the item,” thereby 
“remov[ing] [it] from the list of matters of which the Council is seized.” S.C. Res. 1506, supra note 160, ¶¶ 1-3. 
166 An arms embargo against Eritrea and Ethiopia included both a sunset clause and a termination trigger should the 
Secretary-General report that a “peaceful definitive settlement of the conflict has been concluded.” S.C. Res. 1298 
¶¶16-17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1298 (May 17, 2000). In Haiti, embargo provisions would come into effect at a pre-
determined time unless the Secretary-General reported that their imposition was “not warranted” in light of 
negotiations; the measures would be lifted upon the Secretary-General finding that “the de facto authorities in Haiti 
have signed and have begun implementing in good faith an agreement to reinstate  the legitimate government.” S.C. 
Res. 841, ¶¶3, 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (June 16, 1993). The French operation in Rwanda, Opération Turquoise, 
was also authorized for a limited period of time (two months), but this authorization could be terminated earlier if 
the Secretary-General determined that the expanded UNAMIR operation was “able to carry out its mandate.” S.C. 
Res. 929, ¶4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/929 (Jun. 22, 1994). 
167 S.C. Res. 1493, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1493 (Jul. 28, 2003). 
168 Id. at ¶¶25-27; Annual Review 2006, supra  note 132, at 75. 
169 S.C. Res. 918, U.N. Doc. S/RES/918 (May 17, 1994).  See also S.C. Res. 1564 (June 1, 204) (applying Chapter 
VII only to that part of the MINUSTAH mandate covered in ¶7). 
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humanitarian measures to which the Article 39 determination would not apply, while part “B” 
expounded on issues relating to the use of force and mandate expansion.170 
¶88 The domestic experience provides one further procedural mechanism of note—intra-
governmental checks.  In such systems, where the powers to both declare an emergency and act 
during it reside in the same entity, typically the executive, a secondary power is entrusted to the 
parliamentary body to ratify, reject or extend the declaration.  Within the U.N., the General 
Assembly has a recognized residual power in matters of international peace and security, but it 
cannot make determinations of legal effect, nor can it act at all if the Council is seized of a 
matter.  Ratification of Article 39 determinations and the invocation of Chapter VII by a majority 
of the General Assembly would not unduly delay Council action.  It would, however, legitimate 
Council decisions through “democratic” process, and give voice to Troop Contributing Countries 
that make Chapter VII operations possible.171  It would also provide a substitute for review by 
requiring the Council to draft clearer resolutions, under threat of rejection.  To be fully 
enforceable, the new practice would likely require an amendment to the Charter—perhaps, as a 
compromise, in lieu of Council membership reform—but revision of rules of procedure and 
subsequent practice could institutionalize the mechanism, at least informally.  
¶89 Investigation of Article 39 is, ultimately, just a small portion of the equation.  Council 
exercise of Chapter VII powers, and the concrete manifestation of those powers in Council- 
authorized action, not only impact the constitutional framework of the organization, but also 
directly relate to the phenomenon of legal derogations.  Not surprisingly, the same issues of 
justiciability and limits emerge again in both of these areas. 
III. THE BOUNDS OF COUNCIL POWER 
¶90 The inexhaustive language of the Charter has prompted some to contend that the freedom 
of the Council “to decide when to apply coercive measures is matched by an equal discretion as 
to what measures may be taken.”172  Following an Article 39 determination, Article 41 permits 
the Council to move beyond provisional measures and “effect its decisions” through “measures 
not involving the use of armed force,” including but not limited to the “complete or partial 
interruption” of economic and diplomatic relations.173  If such measures are deemed 
“inadequate,” Article 42 grants the Council the authority to take action by “air, sea or land 
forces” and again offers an inexhaustive list of such operations.174  The binding effect of Council 
decisions and the thrust of its powers are cemented in Articles 25 and 49, which assure that 
Member States “agree and accept to carry out the decisions of the Council” and “shall join in 
affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures” decided upon. 175   
¶91 Guidance from the Charter in defining the nature of and constraints on Chapter VII 
authority is imprecise and in many ways lacking.  Offering few finite enumerations or rules, it 
establishes a system of exceptions and corresponding powers that suggests—but does not 
                                                 
170 S.C. Res. 814, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993). 
171 Operational enhancements may help in reducing the arbitrary impact of politics on Council action.  The soon-to-
be operational Standing Police Capacity initiative, and the more theoretical Rapid Reaction Force, would allow for 
Article 39 determinations and corresponding mandates to be developed in a more “ideal” sense, without having to 
compromise to account for commitment gaps.   
172 Grayson Kirk, The Enforcement of Security, 55 YALE L.J. 1081, 1089 (1946). 
173 U.N. Charter arts. 40, 41. 
174 Id. at art. 42. 
175 Id. at arts. 25, 49. 
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dictate—that Chapter VII power, though broad, is often met by countervailing considerations 
that may limit its exercise.  When Chapter VII is conceptualized by reference to the regulative 
ideals of emergency, these considerations are underscored, and the corresponding limits distilled.  
Before exploring these limits, however, it is worthwhile to investigate what the Council can do, 
as opposed to what it cannot. 
A. The Power Afforded by Chapter VII… 
1. To Validly Derogate 
¶92 As in the context of emergency, Chapter VII power is important not simply for its 
affirmative grant of positive powers, but also for the provided legal (as opposed to moral) 
authority to validly derogate from deep-seated provisions of international law.  Foremost under 
Chapter VII is the Council’s authority to enforce its decisions through the use of force, 
suspending the application of Article 2(4)’s fundamental prohibition.  A prohibition on the threat 
or use of force is generally accepted to be not merely treaty nor customary law, but a peremptory 
norm having the character of jus cogens.176  Yet, the Charter has established a system providing 
for its temporary suspension vis-à-vis the Security Council during certain states of exception.  
This authority has not solely rested with the Council, but has been extended to authorized actors 
through Council delegation. 177  Thus, the Charter carves out a powerful foundation for concrete 
Council action, as well as a truly exceptional power in its own right. 
¶93 The invocation of Chapter VII also entails an exception to Article 2(7).178  Here, however, 
the Council is not temporarily derogating from the norm of non- intervention in domestic affairs; 
Article 2(7) remains in force throughout.  In declaring a situation an act of aggression, a threat to 
or a breach of international peace, a determination under Article 39 inherently adjudicates the 
matter to be non-domestic in nature and within the purview of Council jurisdiction. 179  Still, the 
power to decide on the applicability of Article 2(7) is an exceptional and controversial 
prerogative.  For Member States, Article 2(7) represents a codified safeguard of the venerable, 
albeit timeworn, concept of sovereignty in its full Westphalian regalia, protecting the exclusive 
control by a State of its territory and internal affairs.180  Frequently championed by Member 
States and referenced by the General Assembly, Article 2(7) is a primary safeguard of Member 
State’s rights against U.N. infringement.  Still, as in the emergency context where the 
government may derogate from certain human rights safeguards to address a national threat, so 
too may the Council intervene without consent in the ostensibly domestic matters of its 
constituent units where they are deemed to threaten the greater international good.  
¶94 Once clear of the proscriptions of Article 2 and their practical effects, the Council has 
construed its powers under Chapter VII broadly.  Article 42’s examples of military actions 
                                                 
176 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 353, 356 (June 27).  See also G.A. Res. 
2625 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
177 In addition to Article 42’s use of force provisions, other measures contemplating a suspension of Article 2(4) 
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53. U.N. Charter arts. 2 (4), 42, 51, 53. 
178 Id. at art. 2, para. 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state…but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”). 
179 FRANCK, supra note 14, at 222. 
180 See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities , supra note 178 at 356; see also DAN SAROOSHI, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWERS 9 (Ian Brownlie ed., Oxford Univ. Press) (2005). 
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available to the Council were inserted at the request of the Soviet Union as a consolation for its 
failure to insert a more exhaustive provision. 181  Owing at least in part to these partial 
declarations of power provided in Articles 41 and 42, courts have acknowledged the myriad 
implied powers nevertheless possessed by the Council.182  Through this judicial creation of 
implied powers, the courts have bolstered the Council’s far-reaching interpretation of its 
capabilities.  More importantly, the kompetenz-kompetenz of the Council has flourished as the 
international community has struggled to determine the authority of courts, particularly the ICJ, 
to review Council resolutions.  Given this judicial backdrop, the Council has taken liberties in 
construing its Chapter VII vires.  
2. The Breadth of Chapter VII Powers as Determined by the Council’s Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
¶95 The expansion of Chapter VII powers over the years has been a two-fold practice, 
involving both more frequent resort to “typical” Chapter VII exercises and affixing the Chapter 
VII label to a broader range of enterprises.  With respect to “peacekeeping,” Chapter VII 
authority was previously invoked in enforcement missions designed to induce one or more 
parties to adhere to peace arrangements.183 That authority has now been extended to many new 
operations more accurately described as complex peace operations involving variants of 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  Additionally, the Council’s frequent use of the 
blanket “all necessary means” mandate has expanded the discretionary use of Chapter VII within 
such missions.   
¶96 Today, the exercise of Chapter VII power is not simply more eclectic but also more 
profound.  Chapter VII resolutions often demand change from economic, legal and constitutional 
systems both at the international and domestic level.  This was evident in Kosovo, where the 
U.N. not only redefined the system of government, but spearheaded the privatization of the 
economy as well.  It is also apparent in the U.N. operation in Cote d’Ivoire, where—much to the 
chagrin of the Ivorian President 184—Resolution 1721 gave the Prime Minister full authority to 
carry out the peace process, effectively re-allocating many functions of a sovereign government 
between its branches.   
¶97 This expansion of Chapter VII is nowhere more apparent than in the area of international 
criminal law.  Though its ability to modify standards of immunity in Chapter VII operations has 
long been recognized,185 the Council has assumed new prominence in the international judicial 
                                                 
181 Indeed, throughout the drafting process, efforts to add to Article 42’s list were rejected as implying the exclusion 
of other actions, thus “restricting the range of measures available to the” Council.  CHESTERMAN, supra note 70, at 
751. 
182 For example, in the Tadic case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) concluded 
that “the measures set out in Article 41 are merely illustrative examples which obviously do not exclude other 
measures.”  Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, ¶35.  The International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) Advisory Opinion in the 
Namibia case held that “the powers of the Council under Article 24 are not restricted to the specific grants of 
authority contained in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII . . . . the Members of the United Nations have conferred upon 
the Security Council powers commensurate with its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security.” Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276  (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. ¶ 110; see also U.N. Charter 
art. 24 (on the functions and powers of the Security Council). 
183 TREVOR FINDLAY, THE USE OF FORCE IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS 5 (Oxford Univ. Press) (2002). 
184 S.C. Res. 1721, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1721 (Nov. 1, 2006); BBC News, PM Signals New Ivorian Stand-Off, Nov. 8, 
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6130248.stm. 
185 See Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, art. V, Feb. 13 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15; see 
also Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not To Waive: Immunity and Accountability in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 
18 CONN. J. INT’L. L. 103, 104 (2002). 
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system in the past decade.  Under Chapter VII pretenses, the Council has created a system of 
criminal justice tribunals that has perhaps extemporaneously helped overcome, or circumvent, 
the procedural and jurisdictional shortcomings of the ICJ and the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).   
¶98 In domestic systems, establishing such dual-court systems is a far-reaching but not 
infrequent exercise of emergency power.  It is also a power subject to executive abuse and 
lacking constitutional constraints.186  Though the Security Council has not abused its powers in 
creating special tribunals, its exercise of exceptional power is similar in using decree or 
resolution to overcome the limitations of the existing system in exceptional matters pertaining to 
transitional justice and security.  In Resolution 1315, for example, the Council acted under its 
Chapter VII authority to solidify agreement on a Special Court for Sierra Leone to try those 
responsible for crimes against humanity and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. 187  More famously, under Resolutions 827 and 955 the Council established the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), respectively.188  Whether the Courts’ establishment was ultra vires, 
or grounded in the Council’s implied powers or authority to establish subsidiary organs, was the 
subject of considerable debate.189  When presented with the question, the Appellate Chamber of 
the ICTY determined that the Security Council was competent to create a judicial tribunal based 
on its powers under Article 41.190 
¶99 In these cases, the Council utilized its Chapter VII powers stemming from exceptional 
post-conflict situations to establish a new tier of courts designed to handle cases particularly 
linked to international security.  Though these special tribunals are not entirely analogous to 
domestic security courts insofar as they often operate where foundational judicial systems are 
lacking, a parallel is worth noting.  In each, the Council sought to overcome the procedural and 
jurisdictional limitations of existing venues, while creating a forum prone to acting more reliably 
and predictably in a manner consistent with Council interests.  In so doing, Council action 
parallels that of domestic regimes in seeking to take particularly important security interests out 
of the hands of the “unsatisfactory” regular courts.  However, asserting this greater executive 
role in judicial affairs compromises the independence of the judicial branch, and corrodes the 
distinction between governmental functions.   
B. The Melding Together of Governance Functions under Chapter VII  
¶100 Domestic emergency powers have a tendency to creep into non-emergency spheres and 
thereby weaken republican and constitutional safeguards in these areas.  Historically, 
governments have proven altogether too susceptible to the “narcotic effect” of the less-
burdensome governance mechanism.191  In Italy, for example, a constitutional provision allowing 
                                                 
186 Denis J. Sullivan, Countries at the Crossroads 2005, Country Report: Egypt, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/modules/publications/ccr/modPrintVersion.cfm?edition=2&ccrpage=8&ccrcountry=8
4 (last visited Feb. 21, 2007); see also Lesch, supra note 138. 
187 S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000). 
188 S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc.S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
189 See, e.g., Alex Marschik, The Security Council as World Legislator? Theory, Practice & Consequences of an 
Expanding World Power, INST . FOR INT’L. L. & JUST . Working Paper 2005/18 11 (2005) 
http://www.iilj.org/papers/documents/2005.18Marschik.pdf. 
190 Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, ¶¶ 28-38. 
191 GROSS AND NÍ AOLÁIN, supra  note 17, at 233 (citing Mordechai Mironi, Back to Work Emergency Orders: 
Government Intervention in Labor Disputes in Essential Services, 15 Mishpatim 350, 380-86 (1986)). 
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the government to adopt “provisional measures having the force of law” in situations of 
“necessity and emergency” has since blossomed into a customary practice of “executive 
legislation by law-decrees.”  No longer contained within the emergency, these law decrees are 
now the “normal form of legislation.”192 
¶101 Under the auspices of Chapter VII, the Security Council has extended its jurisdiction well 
beyond the traditional realm of the executive branch, and asserted its competence to legislate and 
occasionally act in a quasi-judicial fashion.  In addition to its aforementioned willingness to 
establish new judicial fora, the Council has also shown a propensity to use Chapter VII 
resolutions to make determinations regarding legality on its own.  In this manner, it effectively 
bypasses the international legal system entirely.   
¶102 Admittedly, the Council has long made legal determinations in resolutions that have not 
invoked Chapter VII.  In 1965, the Council condemned the regime in Southern Rhodesia and 
found its declaration of independence to have “no legal validity.”193  Three years later, the 
Council condemned an Israeli strike against the Beirut Airport as a “flagrant violation of the 
United Nations Charter and [prior] cease-fire resolutions.”194  Later, it determined by resolution 
that the Israeli practice of establishing settlements in occupied territories had no legal validity; it 
also notably found that the presence of South Africa in Namibia was “illegal and that 
consequently all acts taken by the Government on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the 
termination of the Mandate [would be] illegal.”195  Though certainly possessing judicial 
language, without the legally binding force of Chapter VII, such declarations were at worst 
political and at best advisory. 196   
¶103 More recently, however, the Council has made legal determinations under Chapter VII 
authority.  Following a non-Chapter VII determination that the annexation of Kuwait had “no 
legal validity” and was to be “considered null and void,”197 the Council acting under Chapter VII 
in Resolution 670 commented that Iraq had “committed grave breaches” of the Geneva 
Convention. 198  Subsequently, in Resolution 687 the Council determined that Iraq “[was] liable 
under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the 
depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a 
result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.”199  It further determined that Iraqi 
statements repudiating foreign debt “were null and void.”200  Supported by the binding force of 
Chapter VII, as well as Council-created enforcement mechanisms (in this case, a Compensation 
Commission), such determinations represent the Council’s assumption of judicial functions, 
albeit with little augmentation of corresponding fact- finding, intelligence or procedural checks.   
                                                 
192 AGAMBEN, supra note 17, at 17-18. 
193 S.C. Res. 217, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/217 (Nov. 20, 1965). 
194 S.C. Res. 248, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/248 (March 24, 1968). 
195 S.C. Res. 446, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/446 (March 22, 1979); S.C. Res. 276, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/276 (Jan. 30, 
1970). 
196 In the case of the Namibian resolution, the Finnish representative proposed that the Council subsequently ask the 
International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the “legal consequences for States of the continued 
presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276.”  The Soviet Union and 
Poland abstained, preferring the earlier political declaration to a genuine legal opinion, but the Council nevertheless 
adopted the proposal and referred the question to the Court. BAILEY, supra note 163, at 244-45.  The Council’s 
determination was, by this tacit admission, a political one; to give it legal weight, a judgment by the International 
Court of Justice was still needed.  
197 S.C. Res. 662, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 (Aug. 9, 1990). 
198 S.C. Res. 670, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/670 (Sept. 25, 1990). 
199 S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991). 
200 Id. ¶ 17. 
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¶104 The Security Council has also used Chapter VII to justify its assumption of legislative 
competences.201  Wary that “the suppression of international terrorism is essential for the 
maintenance of international peace and security,” the Council in 1999 enacted Resolution 1267, 
imposing sanctions—most notably, the freezing of funds—against designated members of the 
Taliban so as to deter and prevent their support for suspected terrorists.  202  In the process, it 
created a body to oversee state implementation.  Subsequent to the 9/11 attacks in the United 
States, the Security Council directly targeted actors directly responsible for terrorism.  
Resolution 1373 again invoked Chapter VII, defining terrorism as a threat to international peace 
and security, and obliging Member States to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism, 
criminalize the willful provision or collection of funds to and from a terrorist group, and freeze 
the funds of individuals and entities facilitating terrorist acts.203  It further established the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor implementation of the measures laid out.204   
¶105 Though this counterterrorism regime has successfully frozen hundreds of millions of 
dollars in assets of entities and individuals tied to terrorist networks,205 it is more notable here for 
its establishment of a prospective regime of some permanence.  Whereas Chapter VII has 
traditionally provided for post-hoc enforcement measures, the Council has used its exceptional 
powers to criminalize certain activities as well as to create forward-looking bodies.  In the 
process, questions of propriety and institutional competence arise.  Moreover, the needed clarity 
of legislation-by-resolution is called into question by the linguistic vagaries of diplomatic 
compromise.  The Councils’ legislative acts have not gone unnoticed.  India expressed concern 
“at the increasing tendency of the Security Council in recent years to assume legislative and 
treaty-making powers on behalf of the international community, binding on all States.”206  Nepal 
cautioned that the Council “should work within its mandate” and “resist the temptation of acting 
as a world legislature, a world administration and a world court rolled into one.”207  Several other 
countries noted that although legislation was beyond its competence, the Council could so act but 
only under exceptional circumstances when faced with an urgent threat.208 
¶106 Even if Chapter VII did grant legislative authority to the Council, the Council still would 
have improperly extended that authority, as the urgency of the threat addressed by Chapter VII 
legislation is not always apparent.  As mentioned in Section II, the Council has acted multiple 
times under Chapter VII “in the interests of international peace and security” to immunize peace 
operations personnel of contributing States not parties to the Rome Statute.209  It has even done 
so in operations where it has referred other crimes to the International Criminal Court’s 
                                                 
201 Legislation is here used to refer to broadly applicable, prospective measures not restricted to the immediate 
situation from which they arose, nor limited to named entities nor by time.  Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as 
World Legislature, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 175, 177 (2005). 
202 See S.C. Res. 1214, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1214 (Dec. 8, 1998); see also  S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 
15, 1999). 
203 S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
204  Id. ¶ 6.  Later resolutions imposed travel restrictions as well. S.C. Res. 1617, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 
2005).  See also S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (April 28, 2004); S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 
(Oct. 8, 2004). 
205 Press Release, United States Department of Treasury, Treasury Report on Progress in the War on Terrorist 
Financing (Sept. 11, 2003), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/js721.pdf. 
206 The Permanent Representative of India, Letter to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security 
Council , U.N. Doc. S/2004/329 (Apr. 28, 2004).  
207 U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4950th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4950 (Apr. 22, 2004). 
208 Id. at 5, 28; U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4956th mtg. at 3, UN Doc. S/PV.4956 (Apr. 28, 2004). 
209 S.C. Res. 1422, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (July 12, 2002); S.C. Res. 1487, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487 (June 12, 
2003). 
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jurisdiction. 210  In granting immunity and changing the burden of prosecution to prove that the 
alleged act was not “arising out of or related to the operation,” the Council has effectively 
legislated on a noticeably “normal” matter traditionally decided by convention and treaty.  In so 
doing, it has taken advantage of the less cumbersome processes required for Chapter VII action 
and abused the notion of exception inherent in Chapter VII’s constitutional and normative basis.   
¶107 The entrenchment and creep of Chapter VII powers into spheres previously outside of the 
Chapter VII jurisdiction is an evolution reminiscent of emergency powers that further suggests 
the merit of a common juridical approach to the two powers. 
C. The Limits of Emergency Powers 
¶108 In many emergency situations, limits on governmental power are difficult to discern.  
Blanket authorizations providing for variants of “all necessary measures” imply a political space 
for decision closed to legal intervention.  Yet even where authorizations are broad and malleable, 
domestic and international courts alike have found discernable substantive limits to such 
authorizations.  Fundamental rights and corresponding judicial guarantees, such as habeus corpus 
and amparo, have been treated as beyond the reach of emergency powers,211 and form the 
backbone of a burgeoning system of checks on the exercise of emergency powers.  These 
constraints fall into two broad categories—ex ante and ex post.    
1. Ex Ante Limits 
¶109 The first locus of limits on emergency power lies within the basic law, typically a 
constitution—the traditional bulwark against the arbitrary exercise of government power.  
Certain constitutions include threadbare “all necessary measures” provisions without further 
guidance, such as the infamous Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution; other constitutions 
specify the scope of emergency powers more explicitly.  Some delineate those rights that are not 
subject to restriction or modification, 212 while others enumerate provisions and rights that can be 
suspended through the use of emergency powers.213  In either case, constitutional limits provide 
ex ante limits to the exercise of exceptional power and form an important basis for judicial 
review.  Statutory restraints similarly codify limits to governmental discretion, but prove more 
pliable and less enduring in practice.  The Turkish experience, for example, illustrates the 
weakness of statutory limits, as emergency decrees there have expanded the theoretically “fixed” 
list of permissible actions on several occasions.214   
¶110 A final ex ante domestic limit, the sunset clause, appears in both constitutional and 
statutory schemes.  Sunset clauses provide notice to all parties that actions taken under 
emergency justification will expire after a finite period of time, and secure, at least formally, the 
temporary nature of emergency powers.   
                                                 
210 See S.C. Res. 1593, ¶¶ 4, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).  
211 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts 27(2), 25 and 8 
American Convention on Human Rights), Inter-Am. C.H.R., OAS/Ser.L/III.19, doc.13 (1988). 
212 See, e.g., PORT . CONST . art. 19(6); Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 56(3) 
(Russ.); S.  AFR. CONST . 1996 art. 37. 
213 See, e.g., Constitución [Constitution] art. 55 (C.E. 1978) (Span.); FIJI CONST . art. 187(3) (1997); PAN. CONST . art. 
51 (2004); EL SAL. CONST . art. 29 (1983). 
214 State of Emergency Law, arts. 9, 11 (1983) (Turk.). 
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¶111 In concert with these domestic constraints, the non-derogable provisions in international 
human rights instruments provide a tangible set of standards guiding valid exercise of emergency 
powers.  Still, the impact of these ex ante limits depends on effective enforcement mechanisms.   
2. Ex Post: Review 
¶112 It has been the province of courts of general review and international courts of human 
rights to secure the proper exercise of emergency power.215  Nonetheless, many domestic and 
international courts have failed to do so.  Domestically, where judicial review is not barred by 
constitutional or legislative provision, judges have frequently proven unwilling to rule against 
the government where information is incomplete and decisions may in fact come at a 
“subsequent cost” to national security. 216  Because of these concerns, judicial review has been 
inconsistent in many countries.217   
¶113 International courts have likewise struggled with the concept of emergency review, often 
extending the “margin of appreciation” doctrine to account for their limitations.  As in the 
domestic setting, incomplete information and difficult standards of review complicate the task of 
international courts, as does their limited fact- finding capabilities.  Reports compiled under 
provisions such as Article 40 of the ICCPR fail as substitutes, as they are largely “unfocused, 
subject to substantial delays, and unequipped either to produce or test the veracity of relevant 
information.”218  Paucity of information is only one challenge facing international courts; another 
is applying the evidence to a legal framework.  Here, the political nature of the question 
continues to hinder judicial review. 219  In spite of these infirmities, substantive judicial review 
has developed and been supplemented if not sustained by international courts.  Though 
inconsistent rulings have often reflected political rather than legal principles,220 an emergency 
jurisprudence of at least some coherence has emerged.  Those court decisions challenging 
governmental action have revolved primarily around fundamental principles of necessity and 
proportionality, although some cases have been decided on reasonableness grounds as well.221 
¶114 The emergency doctrine’s requirement that measures not exceed the extent warranted can 
appear ex ante in domestic law, 222 and has been inferred by reviewing courts as a corollary to the 
“strictly required” derogation provisions of the international human rights instruments.223  Under 
                                                 
215 While some countries have established special tribunals mandated to review appeals relating to particular 
regulations, they are prone to executive abuse and contain lesser procedural safeguards.   
216 David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis , 101 MICH. 
L. REV. 2565, 2566 (2003). 
217 As an example, consider Israel, where for over forty years no emergency regulation was invalidated as 
“unreasonable.”  MENACHEM HOFNUNG, DEMOCRACY, LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN ISRAEL 64 (Dartmouth 
Publishing 1996). 
218 Joan Hartman, Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies, 22 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 41 
(1981).  
219 See, e.g., A. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t., (2004) QB 335 at 110, 151 (holding that the decision as to 
which powers were to be employed was a political matter, on which judicial judgment could not be made); see also , 
DYZENHAUS, supra note 17, at 177.  
220 GROSS AND NÍ AOLÁIN, supra note 17, at 274-75 (analyzing the European Court’s strong stance in The Greek 
Case and concluding that “where ostensibly democratic states have engaged in the suspension of certain rights 
guaranteed under the convention, the commission and court have been less exacting in their requirements”). 
221 In Karunathilaka and Another v. Dayananda Dissanayake, Comm’r of Election and Others Case No. 1 , 1 Sri 
L.R. 157, 179-81 (1999), the Sri Lankan Supreme Court invalidated an emergency measure suspending a local 
election poll date as having no reasonable nexus to the national emergency.  
222 See, e.g., Basic Law: The Government, art. 38(e) (Isr.). 
223 Aksoy v. Turkey, 23 E.H.R.R. 553, ¶ 84 (1996) (holding a 14-day detention impermissibly disproportionate to 
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the European Court’s jurisprudence, the principle of proportionality is a multi- faceted one.  The 
monitoring organ must consider the need for and scale of a given measure, the need for 
suspending implicated rights, the manner in which the measure has been applied in practice, and 
the nature and intensity of a threat over time and at a given moment.224 
¶115 The axiom of necessity has provided a less yielding and more objective basis for judicial 
intervention.  It does so not as a prospective source of authorization, but as a limiting 
consideration. 225  The necessity requirement applies equally to the “duration, geographical 
coverage and material scope” of the emergency and measures of derogation resorted to.226  In 
1976, the European Court in Handyside v. United Kingdom differentiated the “strictly required” 
standard of the Convention from an ordinary standard of necessity or proportionality, 
determining that it instead meant “indispensability.” Though it split ten to nine in the ultimate 
outcome of case, the Court unanimously agreed upon the stricter standard.227  Despite the 
continuing judicial concession to discretion, this standard has been used since to invalidate 
measures even where courts have agreed with a government’s assessment that a public 
emergency exists.228 
¶116 It is difficult to see consistency in a history of cases that at once establishes a textually 
strict standard while simultaneously conceding a wide margin of discretion to the defending 
state’s interpretation.  It raises the concern that judicial review in such cases is simply a rubber 
stamp, creating legitimacy that in fact has not been earned.  Yet it cannot be denied that courts 
have intervened against questionable government practice.  The consistency sought might in the 
end lie in the fact that courts scrutinize emergency measures more vigorously than they have the 
original question of whether a valid emergency exists.  Irrespective of whether such explanation 
is more empirical observation or normative suggestion, it allows for the relegation of discretion 
to one step of the bifurcated question of emergency, and the use of manageable judicial standards 
in the latter step.  In so doing, it allows for the reconciliation of the political nature of 
emergency, and substantive judicial review utilizing the bedrock principles necessity and 
proportionality. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the threat posed); cf. Brannigan v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993) (holding a 7-day detention 
proportionate). 
224 See ORAÁ, supra note 33, at 148-49 (summarizing the bases for decision of the European Court in several cases, 
including Ireland v. United Kingdom, Lawless, and the Greek Case). 
225 See Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel, HCJ 5100/94 (1999), ¶ 34-36; cf. Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev., 1257 (2004) (“[t]he Constitution itself 
embraces an overrid ing principle of constitutional and national self-preservation that operates as a meta-rule of 
construction for the document's specific provisions and that may even, in cases of extraordinary necessity, trump 
specific constitutional requirements”).  The wo rds of William Pitt echo the need for caution: “Necessity is the plea 
for every infringement of human freedom.  It is the argument of tyrants; it is the creed of slaves.”  William Pitt, 
Speech to the House of Commons, 12 PARL. HIST . ENG. (Nov. 18, 1783).  
226 General Comment No. 29, supra  note 32, ¶ 4. 
227 Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 E.H.R.R. 737 (1976); cf. The Greek Case (Report of the Commission), 1 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. at 176 (1969) (state enjoys a “certain measure of discretion in assessing the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation”). 
228 See, e.g., Demir v. Turkey (21380/93), Eur. Ct. H.R. 88, ¶ 51 (1998); Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru,  Inter-Am. 
C.H.R., (ser. C), No. 52, ¶ 204 (1999).  
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D. Limits on Chapter VII Power 
1. Constitutionality 
¶117 Under Article 103 of the Charter, the obligations of Member States prevail over those 
provided for by treaty. 229  In light of their relative hierarchical positions as sources of 
international law, customary international law short of jus cogens is subject to preemption by 
Chapter VII action as well.230  In contrast, peremptory norms of jus cogens do not permit 
derogation; in the words of Judge ad hoc Elihu Lauterpacht in the Provisional Measures stage of 
the Genocide case, “the relief which Article 103 of the Charter may give the Security Council in 
case of conflict . . . cannot . . . as a matter of simple hierarchy of norms . . . extend to a conflict 
between a Security Council resolution and jus cogens.”231  As in the domestic setting, even 
emergency cannot justify departure from certain non-derogable norms.   
¶118 Jus cogens does not represent the only ex ante constraint on Chapter VII.  The Council, as 
a creature of the Charter, must abide by some form of a constitutional rule of law.  Indeed, even a 
weak construction of the constitutional maxim that “a stream cannot rise higher than its 
source”232 suggests that the Council’s authority is simultaneously conferred and limited by the 
Charter, even though the Council may enjoy broader powers than the states delegating those 
powers to it.233  The ICTY has asserted that the Council is “subjected to certain constitutional 
limitations,”234 and while subsequent practice has conclusively ruled some out,235 several 
substantive limits remain.   
i) Human Rights 
¶119 First and foremost among substantive limits are the principles and purposes of the U.N.  
Under Article 24 of the Charter, the Council “shall act in accordance with the Purposes and 
Principles of the United Nations,” which include the promotion of human rights.236  Such a 
mandate was not simply intended as a hortatory gesture; during the San Francisco conference, 
the U.S. delegate noted that “the Charter had to be considered in its entirety and if the Security 
Council violated its principles and purposes it would be acting ultra vires.”237   
¶120 Unfortunately, the purposes and principles have proven “abstract, general, difficult to 
apply and sometimes irreconcilable.”238  This is particularly the case with respect to the 
exceptional nature of the Security Council.  The uneasy combination of mandatory “shall” 
terminology with non- legal and vague language like the “promotion of human rights” begs the 
question whether human rights law in fact strictly limits Council action, or is simply a factor to 
be considered.  At the time of drafting, more comprehensive formulations met with little 
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success.239  Amendments to Article 24 clarifying the legal status of the provision and refinement s 
of the obligation later in Chapter VII were rejected, at least in part because Member States felt 
they were sufficiently explained elsewhere.240  State-centered approaches to later treaties forming 
the basis of human rights law further call into question whether Article 24(2), in concert with 
Article 1(3), provides for the binding application of human rights law to Chapter VII action.  
Though the UN Human Rights Committee has emphasized that the ICCPR is designed to 
safeguard individual human beings, and is not simply a web of inter-State obligations,241 the 
ICCPR only legally binds states.  While human rights law is broadly applicable to the U.N. 
through its constitutional assumptions and as a subject of international law, its binding effect on 
the Council is dubious. 
¶121 Still, human rights law as applied via the Purposes and Principles provisions remains 
pertinent to Chapter VII action.  Lauterpacht cautioned that one should not “overlook the 
significance of” Article 24(2)’s requirement.242 Judge Weeramantry’s dis sent in the Lockerbie 
case notes that Article 24(2) represents a “circumscribing boundary,” imposing an “imperative” 
duty to follow “categorically stated” limits.243  Notwithstanding these concerns, at least one court 
has decided that there is only one limit to the binding effect of Council resolutions: “they must 
observe the fundamental peremptory provisions of jus cogens.”244   
¶122 Clearly, there is a distinction between the political responsibility to “promote” on one 
hand, and the legal responsibility to guarantee245 on the other.  At present, the Purposes and 
Principles provisions of the Charter present an unsatisfactory constraint on a Chapter VII 
authority that transcends general international law.  Accordingly, courts have been unwilling to 
treat the Council’s adherence to its Principles and Purposes as a binding conception.    
ii) Necessity and Proportionality 
¶123 A second constitutional check—necessity and proportionality—may more rigorously apply 
human rights responsibilities to Council action.  Necessity is written into the plain language of 
the Charter to constrain Chapter VII action.  Specifically, measures under Article 42 are only 
available to the Council if action under Article 41 “would be inadequate;” that is, measures 
involving the use of force are only permissible where necessary to restore international peace and 
security if lesser measures prove, or are assumed, incapable of doing so.  Moreover, even when 
validly acting under Article 42, the Council may only take such action “as may be necessary.”246 
¶124 As in the domestic context, the notion of necessity is tied to imminence.  Accordingly, 
preventive war has been argued to be “unequivocally illegal” and beyond the reach of Council 
power.247  The Security Council has never conceded that a force authorization may be based on a 
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“potential” nor “non-imminent threat of violence.”248  Frequently, the Council issues warnings to 
offending States through non-Chapter VII resolutions in an attempt to avoid intervening before 
the conflict, or perhaps more accurately Member States’ willingness to respond to the nascent 
conflict, ripens.  Resolutions provide for discretion to be exercised by authorized actors in 
matters of policy and operations, but only to the extent such decisions and actions are necessary 
to further the mandate or some subsection thereof.  In addition, mandates frequently provide for 
“further authorization as necessary in the light of developments,”249 allowing for the narrow 
tailoring of mandates to the threat level faced at a given point in time.   
2. Judicial Review 
¶125 The jurisprudence of the ICJ reveals a Court which, content to assert its relevance, has 
done little more than carve out a narrow role through which it can undertake incidental review. 250  
Still, as the U.S. case Marbury v. Madison illustrates, this very assertion of competence is in the 
long run important.251  Though the Court has yet to intervene in Council action, it has established 
its legal authority to do so.   
¶126 ICJ jurisdiction over Council action has two primary bases.  Under Article 96 of the 
Charter, the Council “may request” an advisory opinion “on any legal question.”252  The 
propriety of Council action may also arise incidentally in a case between two states.  In rendering 
its decision on the jurisdictional objections of the U.S. in the Nicaragua case, the Court firmly 
established its authority to decide on matters under the Council’s Chapter VII purview.   The 
Court stated that although the Council exercises functions of a “political nature” in contrast to 
the Court’s “purely judicial functions,” “both organs can . . . perform their separate but 
complementary functions with respect to the same events.”253  “Even after a determination under 
Article 39,” the Court found that it could adjudicate on matters already the focus of Council 
action. 254  It repeated this assertion in the Provisional Measures stage of the Genocide case, 
holding that Council action could not violate jus cogens.255   
¶127 In the Lockerbie case, the ICJ again ambiguously asserted its competence.256  In its 
decision on concurrent jurisdiction in the provisional measures stage, the Court noted that “a 
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decision of the Security Council properly taken in the exercise of its competence . . . cannot be 
summarily reopened,” and Resolution 748 satisfied this condition. 257  Still, the validity of 
Council resolutions was prima facie, rather than an irrebuttable presumption. 258  A Chapter VII 
measure outside of the Council’s competence, or not “properly taken,” could well be subject to 
later review.  Several judges, however, expressed doubt as to whether Resolution 748 prejudiced 
the functions of the Court, and as such lacked validity. 259  Judge Krzysztof Skubiszewski’s 
dissent in the East Timor case later supported this position, arguing that “the Court is competent . 
. . to interpret and apply the resolutions of the Organization” and “make findings on their 
lawfulness, in particular whether they were intra vires.”  In other words, “the decisions of the 
Organization . . . are subject to scrutiny by the Court with regard to their legality, validity and 
effect.”260 
¶128 As acknowledged by the Legal Consequences case, though, the Court possesses no general 
power to review Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII.261  Rather, it is an “incidental 
jurisdiction”262 by which the Court can assess the validity of Council action where relevant to the 
determination of state disputes.  Additionally, as Jose Alvarez notes, its jurisdictional limits 
make it unlikely that the Court would find a Council decision “null and void” per se, but rather 
“illegal” as applied to the parties.263   
3. The “Parliamentary” Check 
¶129 Article 24 of the Charter dictates that the Council has “primary,” but not sole, 
responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security.  Consequently, the Council encounters 
a republican check on its Chapter VII powers.  Unlike checks common to domestic emergency 
regimes, however, the General Assembly cannot restrain the affirmative exercise of Council 
power; it can only act in the face of Council inaction.   
¶130 Article 10 of the Charter gives the General Assembly the power to review matters within 
the jurisdiction of any UN organ and make recommendations, unless the matter is “actually 
before the Security Council.”264  Under the Uniting for Peace resolution, passed by a strong 
majority, the General Assembly reserved the right to make recommendations for “collective 
measures” where “there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression” and the Council has failed to “exercise its primary responsibility.” 265  In case of a 
breach of the peace or act of aggression, the General Assembly further permits itself to 
recommend the use of armed force when necessary. 266  For example, the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution served as the basis for the U.N. Peacekeeping force in the Congo and later the U.N. 
Command for an Emergency Force deployed to the Egypt-Israel border.267  Though its validity 
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was largely affirmed by the opinion, the International Court of Justice in Certain Expenses 
clarified that the power of the General Assembly to act in the maintenance of international peace 
and security was a residual one, and did not include “coercive,” “preventive or enforcement 
measures . . . under Chapter VII.”268  
¶131 In summary, the General Assembly does constrain the discretion of the Council in its use 
of Chapter VII.  But it does so only as a lower bound.  Beyond political opprobrium and its 
authority over the budgetary allotments for peace operations, the Assembly cannot formally act 
to restrain Council measures under Chapter VII; it can only act in its stead.  This is not itself a 
nullity.  Where the Council hesitates, the General Assembly’s recommendations may shape the 
ultimate character of later Council action through resource commitments and operational design.  
Therefore, while the General Assembly’s “Uniting for Peace” authority does not provide the post 
hoc or parliamentary check seen in emergency regimes, it continues to limit Council discretion in 
its response to emergency.   
4. The Hard and Soft Check of Political Considerations 
¶132 The institutional backdrop of Council Chapter VII action most clearly diverges from that 
of the domestic exercise of emergency powers in the sphere of political checks.  The Council’s 
heterogeneous composition and “equality” amongst the P-5 (as guaranteed by the veto) creates a 
decidedly non-unitary body.  In this context, the veto power serves as a hard, albeit non-judicial, 
limit on the Council’s exercise of Chapter VII authority; but it can just as easily be used as an 
obstructionist tool thwarting the valid, and perhaps necessary, exercise of power.   
¶133 The Council’s need for legitimacy, on the other hand, represents a soft political check of 
some importance.269  Recent experiences indicate that the Council’s use of Chapter VII powers 
may be growing faster than contributors’ willingness to act.270  Unlike a domestic government, 
the Council has no sovereign rights, nor does it possess a monopoly on force.  It relies on the 
legitimacy of its decisions, as well as the moral and political import of its actions, to secure the 
resources needed to effectuate its designated measures.  In a system where countries outside of 
the P-5 voluntarily contribute the vast majority of personnel, case-by-case compliance depends 
in large part on “perceptions of the legitimacy of the [C]ouncil and its actions.”271  This 
legitimacy, in turn, depends on “some combination of conformity to shared norms and to 
established law.”272  The challenge once more is to constitutionalize the practice of the Council 
through constraints political and legal, procedural and substantive, soft and hard.   
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E. Limiting Council Power 
¶134 Again, reference to the regulative ideal of emergency suggests that the Council exercise of 
Chapter VII power is subject to legal constraints.  Reform might emerge in any of several 
contexts, including the ICJ’s undertaking of an increased reviewing role.  
¶135 The ICJ could reassess its Charter analysis, and import the exacting standards of necessity 
and proportionality into its review of Council action, whether incidental or general.  Necessity 
has been underutilized at the international level as grounds for judicial review.  Written explicitly 
into the Charter text, it provides a manageable judicial standard by which the Council’s political 
discretion can be reined in.  As in judicial review of emergency, necessity is a multi- faceted 
analysis examining both the measures taken and the threat faced. The violation of human rights 
law can and should be integrated into this analysis.  Though one could imagine an analysis 
wherein Council action that violates human rights law would be prima facie “unnecessary,” such 
a dramatic change in existing legal practice is not required.  Assuming robust scrutiny of review, 
it is enough to treat failure to guarantee human rights as one of several factors in determining 
whether an action is narrowly tailored to the threat faced.  Such judicial analysis would further 
drafters’ intent in promoting human rights, effectuate the plain text of the Charter, and assure 
responsible and proportionate Council action.  Practically, it would be a workable basis for 
review that would avoid a paradigm shift from that of contemporary international judicial 
oversight.   
¶136 Moreover, the Court could advance the process through the amendment of its statute to 
allow for more general jurisdiction over the Council, either in binding dispute resolution or 
through a more broadly available channel of advisory opinions.  A more substantive system of 
review could emerge from modifications to the rules regarding advisory opinions, or within the 
existing system through further judicial refinement of the terms of art “competence” and 
“validity.”  Though the ICJ has been prone to the same judicial deference in matters of 
international peace and security that its domestic counterparts have in emergency affairs, the 
potential for more substantive review exists.    
¶137 The Council itself could create an independent subcommittee or organ dynamically 
reviewing the proportionality, necessity and validity of its measures.  Greater legal regard to the 
necessity of Chapter VII action and development of an international “necessity jurisprudence” 
would further add clarity to gray areas of Council action, such as humanitarian intervention. 273  
The next Section explores an area where the need for limits is particularly compelling: Council 
delegation of Chapter VII authority to other entities.   
IV.  CONTROLS ON DELEGATED AND AUTHORIZED ACTION 
¶138 The decisions of the Security Council rely on the Secretariat and Member States for 
enforcement.  Council resolutions authorize these entities to take prescribed action, and in many 
instances delegate discretionary powers to achieve the resolutions’ ends, subject to the contours 
defined therein. 274  A resolution may delegate such power, whether it directly implicates Member 
State action, as in the burgeoning field of “Council legislation,” or establishes a peace operation 
authorized to use force under Chapter VII.  Any analysis of Council action, therefore, must take 
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into account its bifurcated nature, and appreciate the distinctions between Council design and 
implementation by the authorized parties.   
¶139 Recent practice has demonstrated the propensity of acting entities to not only recognize the 
exceptional nature of Chapter VII, but also to rely on it to justify non-compliance with provisions 
of international law, especially in the field of human rights.  These violations, this article argues, 
are in fact derogations, identical to the common exercise of emergency powers.  Unfortunately, 
such derogation has heretofore occurred in an unaccountable fashion.  Though derogating actors 
have justified their practices through the rhetoric of exception, they have not subscribed to the 
legitimating checks of emergency.  Against the backdrop of effete existing accountability 
mechanisms at the level of implementation, this has opened the door to not simply derogation, 
but violation as well.  If exceptionalism is endemic to Council-authorized action, this article 
argues that it should be practiced in accordance with the ideals of emergency doctrine.  Given the 
idiosyncrasies of the international architecture though, this ideal likely requires resort to a 
pluralistic accountability system.   
A. The Exception Mindset of Peace Operations 
1. Exceptionalism Across Actors and Sectors 
¶140 U.N. peace operations often arrive on the ground with a level of organization and 
coherence mirroring that of their fractured host territories.275  Counted amongst their maladies are 
“countless ill-coordinated and overlapping bilateral and United Nations programmes,” “inter-
agency competition preventing the best use of scarce resources,” and disagreement over the 
hierarchy of mandates and international obligations.276  Accountability mechanisms are often 
muted as the United Nations assumes a measure of authority absent legal checks.   
¶141 Against this tempestuous backdrop, a state of exception is often presumed.  In the broad 
sense, norms of interaction are “smudged” and the short-term commitment to liberal norms is 
eased in order to promote long-term stability. 277  An air of legal malleability hovers over the 
Chapter VII mission.  In the area of reconstruc tion, a peace operation “is one of the rare settings 
in which international institutions and aid organizations remain tolerant and sometimes actively 
complicit in [leakage, widespread waste and bribery].”278  As concerns democratic reform, peace 
operations have been known to interfere with the very same free exercise of democratic choice 
that they otherwise seek to promote.  In Bosnia, for example, the democracy mission turned into 
what one author has deemed a “grotesque parody of democratic principles,” as political 
statements that “could be construed” as expressions of support for territorial separation or 
independence were proscribed by the Election Appeals Sub-Commission. 279  Believing such 
inconsistencies justified by exceptional and temporary security situations, as well as the “all 
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necessary means” backing of Chapter VII, actors across sectors have confidently proceeded.  As 
they have, a sense of exception has permeated the operational sphere.  In the areas of rule-of- law 
reform and human rights promotion, this has at times manifested itself in actions that have not 
measured up to mandates’ lofty goals, as was the case in Kosovo. 
2. Kosovo 
¶142 The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which would become a “high-water 
mark of international authority” and a sovereign government unto itself, 280 demonstrated several 
of these symptoms.  Despite a mandate that charged the mission with the protection of human 
rights and an overarching standards system that required the establishment of an “[impartial]” 
justice system “fully” respecting human rights, the mission often did not practice what it 
preached.281  In its executive role, UNMIK consistently operated above the law with an 
unfettered veto authority through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) 
over all decisions of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG); at the same time, its 
own actions were placed outside of the scope of judicial review. 282  It also infringed on the 
independence of the judiciary, exerting “considerable influence on the practical aspects of the 
courts’ work” through its administration of the courts, control of issues relating to remuneration 
and authority for clarifying the applicable law. 283  The credibility of its rule-of- law component 
was further compromised by unclear legislation, often subject to extensive delays and delinquent 
public notification. 284  UNMIK appointment of judges and prosecutors without parliamentary 
approval further violated the Constitutional Framework.285  As UNMIK more frequently passed 
emergency decrees and characterized its regulations as “political” to bypass legislative processes 
and avoid local input,286 it increasingly operated as if it were in a Chapter VII emergency.   
¶143 These contradictory rule of law efforts reflect the tensions between efficacy, ownership 
and accountability in UN operations.  They also demonstrate a willingness to cut corners and 
derogate from formal legal requirements on the part of a mission cognizant of the exceptional 
situation it faces and the exceptional authority granted by Chapter VII.  In many ways, this 
exceptionalism is understandable; local pressure coupled with “sluggish” police deployment and 
disintegrated infrastructure and institutions, such as that faced in East Timor, often makes rigid 
adherence to liberal conceptions of law and rights impossible.287  A comparable exceptionalism 
on the part of UNMIK, though, was less excusable in its context.  
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¶144 In matters of public order and internal security, the “sine qua non” of international 
administration, 288 the paradigm of exception more closely reflected that of illegitimate 
emergency.  UNMIK practiced executive detention with some regularity in its earlier years, often 
disregarding judicial determinations in the process.289  In October 1999, three men first arrested 
by KFOR were detained under UNMIK Regulation 1999/26 for a twelve month period.  After a 
panel of international judges found that evidence was insufficient for their detention and so 
ordered their release, the SRSG nevertheless extended their detention by executive order.290  This 
exercise of executive power was repeated in the detention of an Albanian suspected of murdering 
three Serbs, again ignoring a judicial order of release.291  Successive executive orders 
subsequently overruled a panel of international judges in extending the detention of four Kosovar 
Albanians alleged to have been involved in the bombing of a bus escorted by KFOR in February 
of 2001.292  Under Regulation 2000/47’s operational immunity standard, no recourse was 
available through which detention orders could be challenged, or compensation sought.293   
¶145 Faced with growing condemnation from the human rights community, UNMIK argued that 
its actions were derogations justified by the “internationally-recognized emergency” in Kosovo.  
Under such circumstances, “special measures” were permissible which “in the wider interests of 
security” would “allow authorities to respond to the findings of intelligence that are not able to 
be presented to the court system.”294  Still, there had never been any formal declaration of 
emergency.  Aware that the Former Yugoslav Republic was a signatory to the ICCPR and that as 
such it might be necessary to declare a state of emergency, UNMIK had for some time in its 
internal communications discussed the matter before the Secretary-General declared the 
“emergency” to be “largely over.”295  Thus, no emergency was ever officially proclaimed, nor did 
UNMIK ever comply with reporting requirements of the European Convention or the ICCPR, a 
central principle of legitimate emergency doctrine.   
¶146 Even had proper derogation measures been taken, the permissibility of UNMIK action in 
these cases remains in doubt.  In the Tadic case, the prosecution maintained that “it is part of 
international law that a fair trial of accused persons will be rendered,” and the “Security Council 
. . . should not take steps or measures which fly in the face of that.”296  Moreover, the ICJ has 
observed that to “wrongfully . . . deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject them to 
physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with the 
                                                 
288 Id. at 45. 
289 See, e.g., Omsbudperson Third Annual Report, supra  note 288. 
290 See Rawski, supra note 188, at 122 (citing Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Kosovo: A 
Review of the Criminal Justice System: Sept. 1, 2000 – Feb. 28, 2001, at 84-85, available at 
http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/969_en.pdf.html). 
291 Zaqiri would ultimately be held in detention for almost two years before being acquitted.  Marshall & Inglis, 
supra note 289, at 113; see also WILLIAM O’NEILL, KOSOVO: AN UNFINISHED PEACE 86 (Lynne Rienner 2002). 
292 CAPLAN, supra note 284, at 64. 
293 Rawski, supra note 188, at 122. 
294 U.N. MIK, UNMIK Refutes Allegations of Judicial Bias and Lack of Strategy (June 25, 2001), 
http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/news/bl98.html.  In this respect, the practice of detention in Kosovo stands in 
contradistinction to that in E. Timor, which was less the product of security concerns than it was a necessity in the 
face of a crippled legal system.  See Amnesty International, East Timor: Justice Past, Present and Future (July 27, 
2001), http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engASA570012001?OpenDocument. 
295See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo , ¶ 62, delivered to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo , UN Doc. 
S/2001/218 (Mar. 13, 2001); see also  O’NEILL , supra  note 295, at 78; see also  Marshall and Inglis, supra  note 289, 
at 104-06. 
296 F.P. King, Sensible Scrutiny: The Yugoslavia Tribunal’s Development of Limits on the Security Council’s Powers 
under Chapter VII of the Charter, 10 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 509, 565 (1996). 
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principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”297  Guarantees of a regular trial in Articles 71 
and 72 of the Fourth Geneva Convention reaffirm this principle.298  Domestically, executive 
detentions have long been targeted by review fora as suspect for their disproportionate and 
discriminatory nature.299  Over time, arbitrary deprivations of liberty and “deviations from the 
fundamental principles of fair trial” have grown to be considered violations of non-derogable 
rights and categorically invalid.300 
¶147 UNMIK’s experience thus represents a dubious invocation of emergency and a dangerous 
example for robust Chapter VII operations.  Especially questionable is the U.N.’s claim of an 
“internationally recognized emergency,” as UNMIK had not reported derogations under any 
human rights instrument.  The most likely formal source of international recognition—the closest 
thing resembling an official proclamation—is found in the Article 39 determination contained in 
Resolution 1244.301  If that is the case, the UN has embarked down a worrisome path, equating 
Chapter VII with emergency despite the lack of corresponding guarantors of accountability.   
3. Al-Jedda 
¶148 The recent Al-Jedda case highlights the distinction between Council action and that of its 
delegatees, and further depicts delegatees’ conflation of Chapter VII with emergency.  Hilal 
Abdul-Razzaq Ali Al-Jedda, a dual British and Iraqi citizen, was interned and detained in 
October 2004 by the American- led Multi-National Force (MNF) while traveling in Iraq for 
personal and business matters.302  Thereafter, Al-Jedda brought an action against Britain, a 
member of the MNF, under international human rights law (European Convention and the 
ICCPR) and international humanitarian law (The Fourth Geneva Convention) seeking his release 
and return to Britain.  Both the Divisional Court and Court of Appeals found in Britain’s favor, 
holding that the applicable regime established by Security Council Resolution 1546 overrode Al- 
Jedda’s rights under the major conventions.303 
¶149 The discretionary delegation of Chapter VII power is readily apparent in MNF’s calculated 
language choices and self-defined parameters.  Resolution 1546 determined that the situation in 
Iraq constituted a threat to international peace and security, and pursuant to Chapter VII 
authorized the MNF to take “all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security 
and stability in Iraq.”304  Though saying little more, the actual Council resolution dictated that 
                                                 
297 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), I.C.J. Rep. 42, ¶ 91 
(1980). 
298 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 71, 72, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950). 
299 See, e.g., Aksoy v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553 (1996);  Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994) (reviewing but upholding a 7-day detention). 
300 General Comment No. 29, supra note 32, ¶ 11-13, 16; see also Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties under Article 40 of the ICCPR (Israel), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93, ¶ 21, (Aug. 18, 1998); Judicial 
Guarantees in States of Emergency, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 13 (holding judicial guarantees essential to preventing 
violations of non-derogable rights are themselves non-derogable). 
301 See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). 
302 The MNF argued that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Al-Jedda was involved in recruiting and 
supporting terrorists, smuggling weapons and conspiring to attack MNF forces.  As such he was detained on a 
preventative basis subject to periodic review.  The Queen (on the application of Hilal Abdul-Razzaq Ali Al-Jedda) v. 
Secretary of State for Defence (Court of Appeals Judgment), Case No. C1/2005/2251, [2005] EWHC 1809, ¶ 5 
(March 29, 2006) [hereinafter Al-Jedda]; see also BBC News, Iraq Detainee Loses Court Appeal (Mar. 29, 2006), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4856406.stm. 
303 The case will be heard on appeal by the House of Lords later in 2007. 
304 S.C. Res. 1546, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004). 
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such measure accord with a series of bilateral correspondence between Iraqi Prime Minister 
Ayad Allawi and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell.305  In a letter dated June 5, 2004, Powell 
noted that the MNF would undertake internment “where . . . necessary for imperative reasons of 
security.”306   
¶150 Citing the preemptive nature of Article 103 of the Charter, the Court of Appeals held that 
“if the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, considers that the exigencies posed by a 
threat to the peace must override, for the duration of the emergency, the requirements of a human 
rights convention [other than jus cogens] . . . the UN Charter has given it the power to so 
provide.”307  Moreover, the responsibilities to promote human rights created in Articles 55 and 56 
of the Charter did not create comparable obligations.308  Resolution 1546, then, “qualified” 
Britain’s outstanding human rights obligations for as long as necessary to “restore peace.” 309 
¶151 The Court’s decision reflects the superimposition of the Council’s overriding authority in 
invoking Chapter VII onto the actions and decisions of those delegatees and authorized actors 
operating in Chapter VII contexts.   It also depicts Chapter VII as emergency and permits 
derogation, particularly in the field of human rights, by authorized actors where necessary for 
security reasons.  As such, Chapter VII effectively triggers the exception clauses of the major 
human rights instruments; it is then left to the courts to ensure that the validating principles of 
emergency doctrine are observed. 
B. The Council Counterterrorism Regime and the Globalization of Emergency 
¶152 With its comprehensive “list and sanctions” regime, the Council has established an 
enduring and prospective multilateral counterterrorism strategy necessitating an entrenchment of 
Chapter VII.  As discussed previously, the system applies sanctions, such as travel restrictions 
and the freezing of funds, to a list of individuals whom Member States allege to be supporters of 
terrorist groups affiliated with the Taliban and al-Qaeda.  This extension of Council jurisdiction 
already mirrors a protracted emergency regime in one respect, providing a pretext and perhaps 
impetus for rights violations by domestic governments.  The Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) 
has been criticized for advising countries to amend their laws in ways that violate common 
norms and basic human rights; countries such as Belarus have used CTC comments to legitimize 
repressive legislation. 310  Meanwhile, the CTC has done little to affect change, consistently 
declining to adopt proposals offered by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.311  
Though the multilateral approach to counterterrorism is promising, the failure to adequately 
balance security and human rights considerations tarnishes the regime’s centerpiece. 
                                                 
305 Id. 
306 Id. at annex. 
307 Al-Jedda, supra note 302, ¶¶ 71-72.  The Court of Appeals decided the question of humanitarian law on the 
grounds that Al-Jedda, as a British national, was not a protected person under the meaning of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, but these facts notwithstanding, the Hague Regulations allowed for the internment of persons deemed 
to be an immediate threat to security.  Id. ¶¶ 40, 46. 
308 Id. ¶ 77. 
309 Id. ¶ 80. 
310 Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, ¶¶ 60-61, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/98 (Dec. 28, 2005). 
311 High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights and follow-up 
to the World Conference on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/18, at 17-21 (Feb 27, 2002) (annex). 
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1. Due Process and Terrorism as a Threat to International Peace and Security 
¶153 In recent years, the Council has more readily used the practice of listing, including the 
imposition of sanctions against designated individuals representing “threat[s] to the peace and 
national reconciliation process” in Côte d’Ivoire.312  The significance of due process is not 
unfamiliar to the Council, having previously been brought to its attention through the Chapter 
VII-based United Nations Compensation Commission313  and an annual General Assembly 
resolution urging States to “guarantee the right to due process” while countering terrorism. 314  
Despite this attention, protection of due process has been largely absent from the Council listing 
process.   
¶154 Only recently has an embryonic system of due process protections emerged, after years of 
concern that “the way entities or individuals are added to the terrorist list maintained by the 
Council and the absence of review or appeal for those listed raise serious accountability issues 
and possibly violate fundamental human rights norms and conventions.”315  Yet despite the 
revision of CTC guidelines and the creation of a “focal point” within the Secretariat for 
processing de-listing requests in Resolution 1730,316 “it would be a stretch to conclude that the 
new [changes] fully respond to due process concerns.”317  Because of the CTC’s consensus rules, 
the outcome of de- listing requests still depends on the Member State that initially proposed the 
listing. 318  The substance of this “review,” seven years in the making, remains questionable.   
¶155 A series of cases from the European Court addressing the resulting deprivation of rights 
again highlights the equivalence between unaccountable Chapter VII practice and illegitimate 
emergency.  The cases of Kadi, Yusuf, Hassan, and Ayadi concern individuals who were added 
to the Council list and whose assets were frozen by European Union regulations adopted in 
response to the Council’s Chapter VII resolutions.319  In each, the applicants primarily alleged 
violations of their rights under the European Convention and its First Protocol, including a right 
to property, a right to a judicial remedy, and a right to non-interference in private life. 320  Finding 
that the regulations were “necessary” to implement Council resolutions 321 and applicants’ 
attempts to distinguish their cases were not dispositive, the Court of First Instance rejected the 
                                                 
312 S.C. Res. 1572, ¶¶ 9-12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1572 (Nov. 15, 2004); see also  S.C. Res. 1727, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1727 (Dec. 15, 2006). 
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319 Case T-306/01, Yusuf v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities , 2005 
E.C.R. II-3553; Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities, 2005 E.C.R. 3649;  Case T-49/04, Hassan v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
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independent culpability of Community states and instead held that primacy extended to Council 
decisions under Chapter VII by virtue of Article 103.322  Accordingly, the Court observed that it 
could not review the lawfulness of decisions of the Council or of the Sanctions Committee 
concerning human rights protection, but it could indirectly review Council action to determine its 
compliance with jus cogens.323  Ostensibly proceeding to review the alleged violations under 
these latter auspices, the Court borrowed the logic of Bosphorus, an earlier case involving 
Council sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to hold that infringements on the 
rights in question were permissible, as they were proportionate to the overriding “fundamental 
general interest” of the international community. 324  In this fashion, the Court substituted a hard 
look at the non-derogability of the rights involved, indirectly considering the importance of the 
justifying threat, for a searching review of Council power.  At the same time, it recognized that 
cooperation could be implemented in a more narrowly tailored fashion; in dictum, the Court 
suggested the need for domestic level hearings to mitigate the negative effects of the 
regulations.325  
¶156 From Yusuf to Ayadi, the European Court asserted itself while acquiescing to Council 
action in a manner reminiscent of the ICJ in Lockerbie.  Noting that its competence was limited 
to the periphery of jus cogens, the Court nonetheless engaged in a substantial balancing of the 
rights in question as an effective proxy for a more general review of Council action.  What is 
more, the Court first engaged in a substantive review of the “necessity” of the European 
Community’s action in implementing the Council resolution.  This review injected into the 
jurisprudence not only a “proportionality” discourse through the “general interest” standard, but 
also the “necessity” standard common to emergency within the question of attribution.  Even 
more important, the Court integrated the discourse of emergency into Chapter VII in recognizing 
that the rights violations were justified by reference not simply to a resolution, but to the 
“fundamental” interest in international peace and security.  At the same time, in expanding the 
Chapter VII shelter to “authorized” acts of derogation, the Court highlighted the deficiency of 
limitations on authorized and delegated action beyond “jus cogens review.”  In its shallow 
treatment of the principles of necessity and proportionality and unwillingness to seize the 
opportunity to pierce the impunity of Council action through its enforcers, the Court avoided a 
chance to constitutionally rein in Chapter VII action.  
C. Restraints, Guarantors, and Mechanisms at the Level of Implementation  
¶157 In providing authorized actors with broad license, Chapter VII shifts the stasis between 
law, rights and security.  It does so in a manner contemplated by the Charter to confront urgent 
and exceptional threats.  As translated to the exceptionalism with which Council-authorized 
actors have gone about their work, Chapter VII rightly recognizes that common legal rules can 
prove to be inapposite in highly idiosyncratic operational contexts.  This exceptionalism, though, 
is only justified to the extent that it is necessary to achieve operational ends, which the Council 
has in turn deemed essential for the restoration or maintenance of international peace and 
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security.  Where unconstrained, it becomes little more than rationalization for cutting corners and 
circumventing safeguards.  Where recourse to sanctions is absent, exceptionalism not only 
threatens populations of individuals with potentially capricious exercises of governmental power, 
but also compromises the promotion of the rule of law.   
¶158 Again, emergency doctrine is a condign framework protecting against such an outcome, 
provided that it can be effectively translated through available oversight mechanisms.  The 
normative thrust, then, lies in conceptualizing a system of checks against unjustified delegatee 
action that can approximate those operating in the ideal realm of emergency, and that still 
provide for a commensurate operational flexibility.  Though a survey of existing practice reveals 
a host of institutional weaknesses, it also presents a matrix of standards and mechanisms which 
can potentially provide a sturdy bulwark against illegitimate action under Chapter VII auspices.   
1. Human Rights Law 
¶159 Enforceability remains the critical limitation preventing human rights law from acting as 
an effective restraint on Council authorized or delegated action.  The U.N. and its officials are 
largely immune to claims of intra vires human rights obligations, as they are not a signatory to 
the major human rights instruments and enjoy broad functional immunity.326  In addition, as the 
Al-Jedda and Kadi-Yusuf line of cases indicate, courts have extended the transcendental authority 
of Chapter VII beyond immediate Council action to its foreseeable “implementers.”  Courts have 
chosen not to attribute intra vires authorized action directly to acting states even where standing 
would be then possible.  Similarly, the courts have not characterized peace operations as Article 
29 subsidiary organs with actions imputable to the U.N., which would bind it by “generally 
accepted norms of human rights law such as articles 9(5) and 14(6) of the ICCPR” relating to 
unlawful detentions and convictions.327  In both instances, the exceptional nature of Chapter VII 
justifies derogations from customary and treaty-based human rights law contained both in 
immediate Council decisions and derivative actions.   
¶160 What this jurisprudence leaves behind are limits existing primarily at the periphery.  In 
addition to holding individuals accountable for ultra vires rights violations, the courts have 
intervened where actions violate jus cogens.328  This limited role holds some promise insofar as 
courts are willing to move beyond Barcelona Traction to recognize a broader list of non-
derogable norms of jus cogens.329  There has been wide support for classifying certain norms 
relating to detention as jus cogens.330  Legal scholars, practitioners and others have argued that as 
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a non-negotiable matter extra- legal detention should be used only when “absolutely necessary to 
protect national security and public order” and only when subject to certain fundamental judicial 
guarantees.331  The expansion and development of this jus cogens jurisprudence can help to 
solidify the outer boundaries of Council action and supplement norms, including necessity and 
proportionality principles, to develop a salient, palatable and broad space in which actors can 
implement Chapter VII decisions. 
2. Humanitarian Law 
¶161 International humanitarian law provides an analogue for the limiting effect of emergency 
doctrine tailored to the war and post-war context.  While recognizing that relaxing legal rules 
during an exceptional situation is appropriate, it too seeks to limit this relaxation primarily 
through principles of necessity, proportionality and distinction.  Obligations under humanitarian 
law defined in the Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions have evolved into customary 
norms over the years, comprising a “minimum yardstick” reflecting “elementary considerations 
of humanity.”332  Indeed, these norms, specifically designed to address the state of exception, 
possess “an absolute and non-derogable character”333 in contrast to the case of human rights law. 
¶162 International humanitarian law applies to belligerent conflict as well as occupation.  Under 
Chapter VII, peace operations have engaged in both situations.334  Yet, while parallels exist 
among belligerency, belligerent occupation and the roles assumed by peace operations, it is an 
awkward if not difficult admission for the U.N. to make.335  As a result, the legal status of the 
U.N. vis-à-vis international humanitarian law has long been unclear.336  Organizations such as the 
International Red Cross have argued that the U.N. is subject to international humanitarian law to 
the extent it engages in armed enforcement under Chapter VII, but several courts have rejected 
such argument.337 This rule changed in 1999 with the passing of the Secretary-General’s bulletin 
on the “Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law.”338  The 
bulletin formally recognizes the applicability of International Humanitarian Law to United 
Nations peace operations under Chapter VII, and establishes legal consequences through 
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prosecution in national courts for violations by authorized actors.339  It also enumerates a series 
of fundamental principles, including certain threadbare safeguards for detention. 340 
¶163 It is now widely accepted that humanitarian law applies equally to UN operations and 
authorized actors.341  While the “right of the United Nations force,” or authorized actor, “to 
choose methods and means . . . [is] not unlimited,”342 the minimalist provisions of humanitarian 
law represent a low threshold for legitimacy.  At the same time, in using standards of necessity 
and terms of art such as “for imperative reasons of security,” the provisions of international 
humanitarian law require standardized, non-arbitrary procedures and corresponding 
safeguards.343   
3. Mandate Construction 
¶164 A third potential constraint on the scope of authority assigned to authorized actors is 
provided by the language of the mandate.  Rather than being construed as blanket license for 
implementing actors, the mandate imposes tangible limits on operational discretion.  If need be, 
language should be refined, and mandates narrowly constructed, to achieve this effect.  Terms 
such as “all necessary means” should not simply endow actors with broad discretion, but impose 
a hard constraint of necessity on subsequent action.  Guidelines for the use of force, frequently 
developed in reports of the Secretary-General and Status of Force and Status of Mission 
Agreements, should be included transparently in the mandate itself.  The ad hoc nature of 
operational practice, which provides little in the way of precedent and regularized doctrine, 
underscores the importance of using precise and, where appropriate, limiting language more 
generally in the mandate.344   
¶165 Substantive limits in the mandate are also desirable.  Territorial and temporal limits on the 
mandate itself and invocation of Chapter VII within the mandate would help rein in delegated 
actions, as would tighter control and oversight measures including “a clear system of reporting 
and accountability.”345  Whether the responsiveness and flexibility of the Council allow for a role 
in operational decision-making a priori merits consideration as well.  Ultimately, though, as with 
human rights, humanitarian law and other standards, mandates ultimately require enforceability.  
In the context of peace operations, neither courts nor the Council itself have asserted a strong 
role in oversight, allowing for the unsanctioned expansion of delegated powers without 
repercussion.   
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4. Mechanisms of Review   
¶166 The existing accountability system is a weak conglomerate consisting of the binding 
authority of judicial review and the political authority of advisory oversight.   Judicial review has 
not proven to be a reliable guarantor of legitimate Chapter VII action, while advisory bodies, by 
virtue of institutional weakness, have been unable to adequately complement judicial 
mechanisms.346   
¶167 Assuming more substantive standards are necessary and desirable to guarantee the 
legitimacy of Chapter VII-authorized actions, the ambivalent role played by international courts 
suggests that a more pluralistic system of accountability might be in order.  Expanding the reach 
of judicial oversight and “hardening” certain aspects of advisory review could improve the 
situation.   However, the historical timidity of judicial review in the context of emergency 
suggests that such an approach might simply buy a bigger rubber stamp.  Rather, the 
idiosyncrasies of international law may in fact make inevitable a pluralistic system. 347  The 
steadier first step lies in crafting a more coherent system of Chapter VII review at both the 
centralized and decentralized (operational) levels by “connecting the dots” and establishing 
proper channels between the upper echelons—the Security Council, global review and the 
operational level.  Such reform should also give affected parties access to review via the legal 
standards discussed in this paper. 
¶168 At present, several loci of judicial review exist, even as the ICC has thus far written itself 
out of the picture.  The ICJ presents a potentially formidable check on Council action, but it must 
be willing to utilize the standards it has been given to carve out a role within the contours of 
exception.  Review also exists at the “local” level, although its competence at this point in time 
lies primarily in national courts prosecuting the criminal and decidedly ultra vires conduct of 
authorized actors.  Meanwhile, criminal accountability reform efforts undertaken by the Special 
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the General Assembly are stagnating. 348 
¶169 Host-territory courts and judicial fora designed to address the exception play review roles 
as well.  For example, the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone expressly provides for 
jurisdiction over serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by peace 
operations personnel;349 the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina issues final and 
binding decisions on applications based on alleged violations of the European Convention or 
other accepted agreements.350  The competence of such courts, however, is not confined to such 
matters, nor should the capacity of such courts to review the general legality of Council-
authorized action according to domestic law and international standards be underestimated.  The 
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Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has long had jurisdiction over whether laws 
promulgated by the U.N. operation comply with the Bosnian Constitution, international human 
rights law, and general rules of public international law. 351  Subsidiary organs have also shown 
themselves able to pierce the Council’s veil in remedying rights violations.  In Kosovo, a 
Detention Review Commission capable of invalidating executive orders was established by 
Regulation 2001/18, though its questionable independence has left its potential largely 
untapped.352  Recently, in Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, the ICTR held itself bound to “generally 
accepted human rights norms,” and consequently found that its inherent powers gave it the 
authority to provide compensation for the violation of a defendant’s right to legal assistance.353  
In connecting the dots between the affected party, liability for Council-authorized action and a 
tangible remedy (in the instant case, US$2,000), Rwamakuba represents a significant step 
forward in developing a limiting jurisprudence. 
¶170 The ICTR’s ability to effectuate its determinations stands in stark contrast to the persuasive 
authority of several mission-specific oversight bodies.  Mission- level ombudsperson institutions 
and human rights advisory panels have been endorsed as “essential” operational components,354 
despite their legal impotence.  The plight of the Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo is 
instructive.355  The office was established by UNMIK Regulation 2000/38 to respond to 
complaints and open investigations concerning human rights violations, administration policies 
and legislation to ensure their compliance with the requirements of good governance.356  
However, its jurisdiction does not extend to all authorized actors (most notably KFOR), and the 
remedies at its disposal are few.  Although the Ombudsperson may correspond with civil 
authorities, offer recommendations and issue special reports for more egregious and widespread 
problems, it cannot issue binding decisions, nor can it affect judicial decisions or directly 
investigate criminal matters.357  As a result, both UNMIK and the PISG have been dismissive and 
uncooperative towards the Ombudsperson Institution. 358   
¶171 Integrating the Ombudsperson Institution into a more standardized regime of Chapter VII 
oversight would likely ameliorate these limitations.  Early inclusion of the institution in 
mandates extending its jurisdiction to cover a broader spectrum of actors and norms and 
enhancing its factfinding powers would help in this respect.  So too would placing the 
ombudsperson within a larger system at the mission level, as the preliminary liaison between 
aggrieved parties and more formal oversight mechanisms, and at the international level, as an 
agent of a larger standing international ombudsperson institution.  Notably, the Generally 
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Assembly has discussed the seedlings of such a proposal as part of it broader consideration of the 
“Administration of Justice at the United Nations.”359 
¶172 Room for improving top-down oversight over authorized action and delegated power exists 
as well.  Models for implementing such a plan range from the World Bank Inspection Panel to 
the previously discussed Council Counterterrorism Committees360 and the freestanding 
Counterterrorism Executive Directorate.  The Peacebuilding Commission provides a potentially 
ready-made oversight mechanism, though its rules of procedure and general modus operandi 
would differ significantly with such a mandate.  The domestic context provides another 
framework in the form of a State of Emergency Inquiry Board like that employed by Ethiopia.361  
A freestanding Chapter VII Inquiry Board, Commission or Committee could serve several 
functions limiting the authority of the Council and authorized actions alike.  It could make 
transparent alleged “transgressions,” inspect and review allegations according to consistent and 
recognized standards of exception, and recommend corrective action to the Council.   
¶173 Certainly, such frameworks for improving oversight may be viable, but to be effective they 
must exist strategically within, and perhaps at the helm of, a broader system of oversight. 
Otherwise, the crystallizing congruency between Chapter VII and emergency at the level of 
implementation will continue to hinder accountable and effective practice. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶174 The word “accountability” is often used as a “protean concept, a placeholder for multiple 
contemporary anxieties.”362  It too easily becomes a catch-all, encompassing matters of 
legitimacy, legality, merit and efficacy.  As used, the term speaks to “answerability,” insofar as it 
seeks to ensure that defined and enforceable limits to actors’ discretion exist.  With the 
conflation of Chapter VII and exception at the level of implementation, the force of these limits 
diminishes.  The Council and authorized actors have been complicit in this trend, excusing their 
own transgressions by reference to the beneficial ends of their work.  Whether the imperative of 
international security is invoked as an after-the-fact rationalization for derogations, or is in fact 
part of the preliminary calculus leading thereto, the normative exceptionalism of Chapter VII is 
crystallized, and without corresponding limits the notion of a lawless and unanswerable cadre of 
actors is reinforced.   
¶175 Exceptionalism, though, does not equate with categorical impunity. 363  The integrity of the 
constitutional system established by the Charter requires that different limits on Council and 
Council-authorized action exist, limits discernable by specific reference to the exception. 
Although the maintenance of peace and security may in fact sit in a position of primacy vis-à-vis 
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the other functions of the U.N.,364 the values of constitutionalism and legitimacy are served by 
giving due regard to both sides in reconciliation.  If the state of exception mindset is to persist, its 
validity—and that of the Council, authorized actors and multilateralism more generally—
depends on the authority of such a system of oversight.  If not, actors flaunting legalism under 
the banner of the UN promise to sever the organization from the nobility of its ends. 
¶176 The danger of Chapter VII anomie is real.  To assure the continued celerity, flexibility and 
effectiveness of Council action while simultaneously respecting the intended limits of the 
Charter, a new paradigm appreciating the Council’s polyglot nature is in order.  The regulative 
ideal of legitimate emergency doctrine provides just such a framework, highlighting deficiencies 
in past and current praxis while providing an archetypal system through which these issues can 
be addressed.  As clamoring for Security Council reform reaches a crescendo (while inching 
tediously towards fruition), the value of such an architecture is particularly propitious.  For in the 
end, the more effective and attainable path to the ostensible goals of reform might well be 
through the Council’s domain, as opposed to its membership.  Time will tell. 
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